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Free Exercise of Religion in
Germany and the United States
Edward J. Eberle'
In this Article, Professor Edward Eberle provides a comparative overview of
constitutional safeguards affecting religious freedom in Germany and the United States.
Specifically the author analyzes the German and American approaches to the free exercise of
religion within their respective constitutional systems. The result is an illuminating exposition
that provides much insight for comparative and constitutional scholars.
In the years following the Second World War, religious freedoms in Germany developed
along similar, individualist paths to those found in the United States Constitution. However,
unlike the Constitution, the Basic Law's provisions touching on religious liberty are detailed and
quite elaborate and further arise from a cultural milieu characterized by cooperation between
church and state. Recently, America has witnessed an evolution in the way the United States
Supreme Court treats the free exercise ofreligion--from a fundamental right, protected as such
by the courts through the employment of an exacting review of impinging legislation, to a value
that is to be considered in the democratic process but which may, ultimately, yield to neutral
legislation.
Professor Eberle posits that an analysis of developments in Germany in the post- World
War llpeiod ields valuable insight into the remarkable shifft injurisprudence that has occured
in the United States. The author itrst describes the nature of free exercise rights within the
German constitutional order before turning to relevant case studies to illuminate the exercise of
religious liberties in Germany The Article then compares the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Sherbert v. Verner to its decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, exposing the shilf in the Court's thinking over the course of recent decades.
Noting the different approaches between the German and American courts, Professor Eberle
offers comparative observations concerning the nature of free exercise freedoms in the two
countries and concludes that such liberties are more vibrant and protective of minority ights
under the German constitutional system. His study is valuable in illuminating the purpose,
utility, and value ofa free exercise ight within constitutional government.
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A. Columbia
University; J.D. Northwestern University Law School. I wish to thank Andrew Beerworth,
Louise Marcus, and Larry White for their valuable comments and research assistance. All
translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
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German religious freedoms center on the free development of
human capacity as it relates to spirituality and exploration of the
transcendent and metaphysical dimension to human life. Grounded in
a historically cooperative relationship between church and state,
religious freedoms have been recalibrated along distinctly more
separationist and individualist paths in the post-World War II
fundamental compact that is known as the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
Contemporary German religious freedoms posit a wide expanse for
the individual exercise of religious freedom and a further expanse
where citizens can enlist the state to facilitate religious practice
through provision of such services as religious instruction in the public
schools, the grant of public corporate status to religious organizations,
and the collection and administration of taxes for churches,
synagogues, or other religious organizations.
Stated in terms of American law, German religious freedoms can
be broadly grouped into the familiar lexicon of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause freedoms.' This lexicon provides a ready rubric
within which to compare the two laws. Notwithstanding this
similarity, German freedoms are significantly more elaborate and
detailed in the text of the Basic Law, giving rise to a more
comprehensive body of law than that found in America.
1. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1024 [Vol. 78:1023
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There are many questions of religious freedom that make for a
worthy comparison in the two laws. Especially insightful would be
evaluation of the relationship between church and state, teaching of
religion in the public schools, and the role of religion in society more
generally. However, for considerations of focus and scope, this Article
evaluates one aspect of contemporary German religious freedoms-
namely, free exercise of religion. The focus of this Article is on the
two countries' treatment of free exercise freedoms.
There are several reasons why this comparative exercise is
valuable. First, it is remarkable how religious freedom has evolved in
the United States during the last twenty years under the leadership of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. We have seen an evolution of free exercise
freedoms from treatment as a fundamental right protected by courts
under conventional strict scrutiny analysis appropriate generally to
rights under the methodology of Sherbert v Verner' to treatment as a
value to be considered in the democratic process that might be eclipsed
by the applicability of general, neutral laws under the methodology of
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v Smith.3
The religious freedoms protected by the Establishment Clause have
likewise undergone a similarly dramatic shift from a distinctly
separationist stance in the relations of church and state4 to a posture of
accommodation of church by state.5 These are seismic shifts in the
architecture of the constitutional design, on par with the Rehnquist
Court's mark in federalism6 and state sovereign immunity' In view of
these dramatic developments, it makes sense to gain some perspective
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("Values that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the
political process.").
4. The approach of the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 602-71 (1971), would be emblematic of the separationist approach.
5. The recent decision in Zelman v Simmons-Haris, 536 U.S. 639, 639-41 (2002),
dramatically signals this shift, authorizing state support of religious schooling through tuition
vouchers and tutorial aid. For public taxpayers objecting to this plan, there would appear to
be coercion of conscience, as people are being forced to pay for religious indoctrination
against their will.
Coercion of conscience of this type was decried famously by Thomas Jefferson, see
THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA BILL FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1785), quoted in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) ("[Tlhat to compel a man to furnish contributions of money
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical ... "), and
James Madison, see JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. app. at 63-64, 66 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898-900 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 62-65, 78-81 (2000).
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on them, viewing them from outside the setting of American legal
culture through the lens of another law. Sometimes the best way to
understand native culture is by observing how it compares to another
culture. "For only by making comparisons can we distinguish
ourselves from others and discover who we are, in order to become all
that we are meant to be."8
Second, there are lessons to be learned from German law.
German law accords wider scope to individual free exercise freedoms
than American law. It is more common the case that a person sincerely
motivated by religion will be accommodated from the constraints of
generally applicable neutral laws. German free exercise law is much
more in accord with Sherbert than Smith. Under the cooperative
church-state relations existent in Germany, the state acts neutrally,
nondiscriminatorily, and with tolerance to all beliefs in providing, for
example, public school rooms as forums for students to receive
instruction in the religion of their choice. It is interesting to note that
the accommodationist approach championed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, most notably recently in Zeiman v Simmons-Harris,9 is a
major step in the direction of German law. Thus, German and
American law are alike and unlike in ways. Specifically, the scope of
free exercise of religion is wider in Germany while Germany and the
United States seem in closer accord over church-state relations.
Third, Germany is a good choice to compare with the United
States. Like the United States, Germany is a highly developed,
industrial, democratic society committed to constitutional government
and situated within the Western cultural tradition. The German
Constitutional Court has developed a sophisticated and comprehensive
body of higher law through its adjustment of society to the Basic Law
by application of independent judicial review in a way similar to the
effect of the Supreme Court on American society. The two Courts are
among the leading exemplars of governing society by higher law. Both
Courts have carved out significant spheres of individual liberty in the
post-World War H era.' ° Like the United States, Germany has
8. Thomas Mann, Joseph in Egypt (1933), tanslated in DAVID P CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, at v (1994).
9. 536 U.S. at 639.
10. For studies tracing these developments, see CURRIE, supra note 8, at 174-237;
EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE
UNITED STATES 79-110, 125-53 (2002); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in
German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. Rnv 247, 247-349 (1989).
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increasingly become a pluralistic society." Thus, gauging how
Germany responds to pluralism in maintaining its balance between the
aspirations of individual freedom and the demands of the social order
is a valuable exercise for us as we observe how the United States is on
the path to an ever more pluralistic society as well. Finally, for the
topic under discussion-free exercise of religion--German freedoms
are roughly comparable to American freedoms as a matter of text,
historical understanding, and constitutional design. Thus, there is
ready and fertile ground upon which to compare religious principles.
Through comparative methodology, we can help clarify the meaning
and purpose of a Free Exercise Clause in constitutional democracy.
To accomplish these goals, the Article proceeds as follows. First,
it is necessary to obtain some background in the German constitutional
order. Part I describes the content and contours of German religious
freedoms, both individual and church-state guarantees, and their
anchoring in the German constitutional order. Part II evaluates free
exercise of religion in Germany with an eye toward comparing it to its
counterpart in the United States. Evaluation of German law forces
consideration of the religious and social values at issue in a Free
Exercise Clause. Part IH pursues this inquiry through consideration of
whether the approach of a Court in Sherbert (preferencing religion
over law) or Smith (preferencing law over religion) seems more
appropriate under constitutional government. Finally, Part IV
concludes with comparative observations about the nature of free
exercise freedoms in Germany and the United States. My study shows
that German free exercise freedoms are both more vibrant and more
protective of minority religious practices than American.
I. GERMAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
A. Gennan Basic Law
The German Basic Law enumerates religious freedom in far
greater detail than the United States Constitution. The key provision
for individual freedom is Article Four, which protects explicitly
freedoms of faith, conscience, and religious or philosophical creed
11. Roughly eight percent of the German population is minority in relation to the
majority German population. The largest minority group is Turkish. Roughly three percent
of the German population is Islamic. EBERLE, supra note 10, at 49. Germany is expected to
become even more pluralistic in the future, especially in view of declining native German
birthrates. The need for a talented workforce will increase the demand for immigration of
skilled labor.
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[ Weltanschauung].'2 Freedoms of faith, conscience, and creed, of
course, lie at the root of religious freedom. Article Four further
protects "the undisturbed practice of religion."'3 These guarantees are
analogous to the Free Exercise of religion guarantee of the First
Amendment. Notable in Germany is the explicit extension of freedom
to profess creed to ideological, nonreligious belief, as well as religious
belief Belief in nature or philosophical or existential belief could fall
within the ambit of Article Four. German protections are thus
designed much more broadly than American protections, which
generally have been restricted to religious belief, based on the text of
the First Amendment.' 4  Finally, Article Four expressly sets out for
sanctuary conscience-compelled resistance to military service.'5 The
Basic Law was the first modem constitution to so do, with several
countries now following this model.'
6
Further notable is that Article Four protections are textually
without limitation. Under principles of German constitutionalism,
textually unbounded protections may only be limited by values of a
constitutional dimension, such as human dignity, the ultimate value of
the German social order,'7 or the fundamental rights of other people.
12. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4(1) (F.R.G.).
13. Id art. 4(2).
14. The Framers substituted the language "free exercise of religion" for "rights of
conscience" in adopting the First Amendment. Michael W McConnell, The Origins and
I'storical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1488-89
(1990). It seems most plausible, therefore, that the Framers intended the freedoms to cover
religious activity.
Supreme Court case law would seem to bear this original understanding out. Compare
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (holding that, "to have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief," and extending First
Amendment protection to the Amish because their life was grounded in a theocratic view "of
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
living"), with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 333-74 (1970) (extending protection of a
congressional statute granting exemption from military service to nonreligious, secular
beliefs). Welsh and United States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), are the only two cases in
which the Supreme Court accommodated nonreligious beliefs from law.
15. GG art. 4(3) (ER.G.).
16. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONsTrruTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF TI-E FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 458 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that the Basic Law is alone among modem
constitutions in protecting conscientious objection); see also KONST. RF art. 59, translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 10 (Gisbert H.
Flanz ed., 2002); PORT. CONST. art. 41, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD: THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC 27 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1999).
17. This theory is attributable to the Constitutional Court's landmark case on
freedoms of communication, Lit, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 7, 198 (205) (1958). In Ltith, the Court interpreted
the Basic Law to posit a basic value order at the apex of which stands human dignity. Basic
rights are emanations of human dignity, and constituent elements of the value order.
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Such an absolute guarantee of basic rights is exceptional. Most
German rights are stated with express textual reservation in keeping
with the European tradition that rights are to be exercised within the
parameters of a social community.8
The main outline of the relationship between church and state is
centered on Article 140, which incorporates as an organic whole the
provisions of the 1919 Weimar Constitution (Articles 136, 137, 138,
139, 141) describing that relationship. The relationship is a
cooperative one. Religion and church play a prominent role in
German society, which these provisions facilitate. 9 The Weimar
provisions set out a detailed and complicated scheme of church-state
cooperation.
Article 136 of the Weimar Constitution secures civil and political
rights, including eligibility for public office; freedom from dependence
or restriction based on religious belief or exercise; protection against
coerced disclosure of religious conviction, coerced performance of
religious acts or ceremonies, and coerced taking of religious oaths; and
prohibits government from inquiring into membership in a religious
body, except for statistical purposes."
Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution, in its first clause, states,
"[T]here shall be no state church."2 In comparison to the broad, albeit
disputed, meaning of the American prohibition on "an establishment of
religion'" the German clause has a more commonly accepted simple
meaning. It means there is to be no established state church and
nothing more. The clause does not mean strict separation of church
and state.22 The numerous remaining provisions of Article 137
guarantee, among other things, the freedom of association to form
religious bodies to "regulate and administer its affairs autonomously
18. See, e.g., GG art. 5(2) (ER.G.) ("Expression rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young people, and in the right
to personal honor."); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Freedom to manifest one's religion or
beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of public ... order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.").
19. KOMMERS, supra note 16, at 443. Cooperation between distinct groups is a trait
of German society, perhaps reflecting and infusing the communitarian bent of the society.
Note the compromise between capitalists and workers resulting in the social welfare state
achieved during the Bismarck era. Today, one might look to the sharing of power between
management and labor present in the co-determination corporate model formed after World
War II.
20. WEIMAR REICHSVERFASSUNG [WRV] [Weimar Constitution] art. 136 (ER.G.).
21. Id. art. 137.
22. CuRRiE, supa note 8, at 245.
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within the limits of the law,2 guaranteeing their independence from
the state;24 the ability to constitute religious bodies to "acquire legal
capacity according to the general provisions of civil law,"25 including as
"corporate bodies under public law,"26 which corporate status allows
them "to levy taxes in accordance with Land [state] law."27 These
provisions are completely without parallel in American law. Official
granting of charters to religious bodies was a major objection of James
Madison," and it is hard to imagine such a turn in American law.
Even though the recent Zelman case represents the culmination
of a dramatic movement toward church-state cooperation in the
delivery of public services, the form of church-state cooperation
described in Article 137 surely states an impermissible reach under
American Establishment Clause law. Under the more pervasive
approach of German law, the state provides the legal framework for
religious bodies to operate and then offers the machinery of
government to administer and collect taxes for religious purposes. In
keeping with the neutral, nondiscriminatory nature of German law,
these benefits are available to associations of a "philosophical
persuasion" as well as a religious one.29
In practice, the main beneficiaries of governmental aid are
dominant religious bodies, such as Protestant, Roman Catholic, and
Jewish groups. Because church and state tend to consist of
overlapping majoritarian configurations, church-state cooperation has
been a comfortable fit. Church and state have tended to share the
same basic values. In post-World War II Germany, the consensus on
values includes promotion of democracy and tolerance,3" which has
helped to reinforce the social order, an important concern in the
aftermath of the war. In a sense, the structure of church-state
23. WRV art. 137(3) (ER.G.).
24. Compare id, with Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345-46 (1987) (exempting a church from federal
antidiscrimination laws so that the church may run autonomously its affairs).
25. WRV art. 137(4) (F.R.G.).
26. Id. art. 137(5).
27. Id art 137(6).
28. CURRIE, supra note 8, at 245 (citing 22 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 982-85 (1811))
(viewing federal incorporation of the Episcopal church in Washington, D.C., as establishment
of religion); see also Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious
Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1587 (1989). It is fair to point out that most religious
organizations today are incorporated as nonprofit corporations and receive tax-exempt status.
29. WRV art. 137(7) (ER.G.).
30. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Private Religious Choice in German and American
Constitutional Law: Government Funding and Government Religious Speech, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1127, 1140, 1145 (1998).
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cooperation operates as de facto establishments. The cooperative
model has functioned well in a society of relative religious
homogeneity. It will likely be harder to implement the model as
religious groups become more diverse."
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, Baptist Church, New Apostolic Church, Pentecostal
communities, Christian Scientists, Mennonites, and the Salvation
Army, among others, have achieved recognition as public law
corporations.32 Other minority religions have had some difficulty
achieving official recognition. This may in part be due to differences
in held values. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses have historically
been denied official privileges because the sect does not allow its
members to vote and participate in the democratic process."
Authorities thus viewed the sect as animated by values antithetical to
the social order and, accordingly, a danger to society. 4 However,
recently Jehovah's Witnesses acquired recognition as a public
corporation in a significant Constitutional Court case," signaling an
important evolution in German thought toward toleration.
Under the system, employers withhold the monies and submit
them to the state, which then distributes them to the religious
denominations in a percentage equal to their membership. Churches
and religious bodies use the money to build seminaries, churches,
synagogues, hospitals, and nursing homes and train teachers, among
other purposes. These arrangements are a way by which religion
secures its place as a main actor within society, if not a preferred one.
Conversely, state support of religion allows government to exert some
control over religion, including the set of values to be inculcated, such
as promotion of morality, democracy, and tolerance.36 The tax is
between 8-10% of a person's income.37 Any person whose name is on
the church or religious body's register is automatically subject to the
31. Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the
United States, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 405,488-89 (2000).
32. Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REv. 643, 649-
50.
33. Id at 650.
34. Gerhard Besier & Renate-Maria Besier, Jehovah' Witnesses' Request for
Recognition as a Corporation Under Public Law in Germany Background Current Status,
andEmpiricalAspects, 43 J. CHURCH & ST. 35, 37 (2001).
35. Jehovah's Witness, BVerfGE 102, 370 (2000) (ruling that a state cannot condition
the granting of public corporate status on the basis of failure to vote; alternative ways must be
pursued to assure loyalty to democratic order).
36. Wuerth, supra note 30, at 1140, 1145-46.
37. KOMMERS, supmnote 16, at 479.
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tax.38 A person must formally withdraw from the church or religious
body to be relieved from the tax." While state collection of church
taxes is constitutional, it has nevertheless given rise to significant
litigation.4"
Article 138 guarantees religious bodies rights, including the right
to own property." Article 139 recognizes Sunday and other public
holidays "as days of rest from work and of spiritual edification,"' 2
expressly resolving an issue that has proved vexing to American law.43
Article 141 provides for the rendering of religious services and
spiritual care to the army, hospital, prisons, or other public
institutions.'
In addition to these express provisions that address religion, the
Basic Law protects religion in a number of articles that cover other
subjects as well. For example, the basic equality provision, Article
Three, specifically singles out faith and religious opinion as
inappropriate subjects to target.4' 5 Article Six guarantees parental rights
41in the raising of their children, subject to state supervision. Parental
rights come into play most dramatically in connection with their
children's education, which rights are guaranteed in Article Seven. 7
Of notable concern to an American is the determination, in Article
7(3), that "religion classes shall form part of the ordinary curriculum
in state schools, except in secular (bekenntnissfri) schools ...
religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the
religious communities."48 Teaching religion in the schools is relatively
uncontroversial. 49  However, the German constitutional system is
careful to protect against coercion of conscience. Article Seven further
provides "the persons entitled to bring up a child shall have the right to
decide whether the child shall attend religious classes."50  And "no
38. Id
39. Id. at 480.
40. CURRIE, supra note 8, at 247; KOMMERS, supm note 16, at 484-89.
41. WRV art. 138 (F.R.G.).
42. Id. art. 139.
43. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-53 (1961) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to a Sunday closing law on the ground that Sundays were
now secular days of rest, even though originally they were conceived as days of repose for
religious reasons).
44. WRV art. 141 (ER.G.).
45. GG art. 3 (F.R.G.).
46. Id. art. 6(2).
47. Idart. 7.
48. Id art. 7(3).
49. KOMMERS, supra note 16, at 471.
50. GG art. 7(2).
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teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious instruction.' '5'
Like the Article 137 provisions, the guarantees for religious instruction
in public schools represent again the German idea of church-state
cooperation in certain essential social services. And there are yet other
provisions of the Basic Law addressing religion. 2
Having described this complex of law, we can see that the
German charter is indeed far more detailed and comprehensive in its
treatment of religion than the United States Constitution. There are
advantages to the German detail. The German charter expressly
resolves many issues that called for Supreme Court resolution in
parsing out the sparser language of the First Amendment. For
example, Article Four resolves the status of conscientious objection to
military service, an issue that proved thorny for the Supreme Court. 3
Further, Article 7 resolves significantly the role of religion in public
schools, an issue of great contention in the United States."
Notwithstanding the greater detail and specificity of the German
text, the scope of German religious freedoms call for significant
judicial interpretation by the Constitutional Court. In performing the
judicial function, the position of the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court is quite similar: both Courts exercise significant
judicial judgment in interpreting their respective charters. It is
worthwhile to note that the United States Supreme Court is not the
only practitioner of judicial activism. Comparing the stances of the
two Courts can help illuminate the role of an independent court in
constitutional democracy, particularly in the realm of individual
religious freedom.
The greater detail of the German charter also addresses many
issues that have no parallel in American law. Prominent among these
is the granting of public corporate status to religious bodies and their
use of state machinery to collect and administer the church tax." Yet,
there is also enough convergence in the freedoms of the two charters to
make comparison a fruitful exercise. Notable here is the topic under
discussion, free exercise of religious freedoms. The text, tenor, and
historical understanding of the countries' Free Exercise Clauses are
51. Id. art. 7(3).
52. See, e.g., id art. 56 (stating that the federal president shall assume office upon
taking oath, with or without reference to God); id. art. 64(2) (same regarding federal
chancellor and federal ministers).
53. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
54. GG art. 7 (F.R.G.).
55. WRV art. 137(A) (F.R.G.).
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roughly comparable, facilitating especially fruitful comparative
examination and, perhaps, cross-fertilization.
Constitutional text is just one part of a country's constitution.
History, Framers' intent, and constitutional structure are other
indispensable elements of constitutional law. Not surprisingly,
German history and constitutionalism differ from American. We need
a brief overview of these issues to understand the context and
dynamics of German law.
B. German History
As a European country Germany shares a common and deep
cultural heritage with its continental neighbors. This has a number of
consequences. Most notable is the long-standing influence of the
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church preserved leaming during the
early Middle Ages before the rediscovery of Roman law. Reading,
writing, mathematics, accounting, and the study of science and
philosophy were some of the bodies of knowledge that found refuge
and nurture within the Church. The deep association of the Catholic
Church with learning is a major factor in the cooperative relationship
that has developed between church and state over education.
Europeans became accustomed to looking to the Church for support
and contribution to society.
Second, for much of German history, altar and throne have been
united.56 The alliance between the ruler and the church further fortifies
this cooperative relationship. The Reformation led by Martin Luther
played a role in this as well. Luther relied on the protection of tolerant
German princes from Catholic authorities to safeguard his life and
teachings. Reliance on state power to protect religion is another factor
leading toward a cooperative church-state relationship. Related to this
is the long history of governmental accord with religious authorities, in
formal treaties called concordats, over issues involving religious
education, social services, and the like. Church and religion have
played a much more active public role in German life than in
American life, and these factors influence the modem German idea of
church-state cooperation.57 Unlike England or France, however,
Germany has never had an official, established state church, although
56. KOMMERS, supra note 16, at 489.
57. See id at 485-87.
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Lutheranism effectively functioned as a de facto established church in
large parts of Germany over a long period of time."
Third, German society has historically been very homogenous.
In the crucial early time when religious ideas and tradition were
formed, Germans shared much in common. Today, German society is
becoming a more pluralistic society. Still, Germany is yet more
homogenous than the United States. 9
Fourth, religious tolerance came late to Germany. Until the
Weimar Constitution of 1919, church-state relations were close and
religious discrimination was widespread. With Lutheranism
effectively operating as the official church in much of the German
Reich, in the nineteenth century, Roman Catholics (who comprised
one-third of the population) and Jews were officially barred from high
positions in the Reich government. Historically, German constitutions
distinguished between dominant churches (Lutheran and Roman
Catholic) and minor sects.6'
Fifth, the Basic Law is framed specifically against the horrors of
the Hitler time. Most notable is the securing of the social order on the
premise of the inviolability of human dignity. This centers the society
around the human person and her flourishing. Religious freedoms, in
particular, are indispensable to this vision because the spirituality of
religion or ideal is a core element of the development of human
personality. Only with the lessons learned from the Hitler time did
Germany secure freedom from coercion of conscience, the essence of
religious freedom discovered and elaborated on centuries earlier by
Roger Williams, 61 John Locke,62 and James Madison.63 Development
of religious freedom in Germany was thus a late affair.
In the post-World War II era, the framers of the Basic Law
continued the tradition of church-state cooperation. The churches were
poised especially well to help in the reconstruction of Germany, as
they were less tainted than other institutions in their association with
58. Germany achieved unity as a country relatively late, only in 1871 under
Bismarck. By this time, Lutheran, Catholic, and Jewish religions were well established in
Germany.
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. KOMMERS, supranote 16, at 444-45.
61. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1867) (1644).
62. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Prometheus Books 1990)
(1689).
63. MADISON, supra note 5, reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at
63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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Hitler. This was an additional factor in facilitating the major role of
church and religion in German society.4
All of this German history provides a very different background
than the familiar American story of the crucial developments in
Virginia, led first by Thomas Jefferson and then by James Madison,
where freedom of conscience and faith were secured and separation of
church and state were instituted in the influential period just prior to
the adoption of the United States Constitution. Experience in Virginia
was the main model for the framing of American religious
protections.65
On the other hand, Germany and the United States share an
important link in history: the flowering of religious liberty, through
judicial protection, occurred in the post-World War II era. The Basic
Law is a 1949 document framed in reaction to the abuse of
governmental power exercised in the Hitler time. Interestingly,
however, so might we observe that state governments' curtailment of
liberties led to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment so that federal rights would be applicable to
the states as well. Included in incorporation were the Free Exercise
Clause in 194066 and the Establishment Clause in 1947.67 Modem
Establishment Clause jurisprudence began with Everson v Board of
Education in 1947.6' The first successful Free Exercise claim was
made in 1963 in Sherbert.69  Thus, the main development of
constitutionally directed religious freedom in the United States, like
Germany, occurred after World War H.
C German Constitutional Order
The German constitutional order revolves around three ideas
quite distinct from American law. These are, first, that basic rights
have an objective or positive dimension that animates the value
structure as well as the subjective or negative dimension that they share
with American law; second, that the Basic Law affects all legal
relationships, public and private; and, third, that duties as well as rights
comprise part of the constitutional order. A brief description of these
64. KOMMERS, supra note 16, at 490.
65. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961); Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13.
See also the authorities collected in Adams & Emmerich, supra note 28, at 1572 n.54.
66. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
67. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
68. Id
69. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ideas is important to understand better the operation of German
freedoms within the constitutional order.
First, Germans define objective rights to mean society's most
fundamental values, which the state is obligated to achieve by creating
the proper conditions in society so that rights might be realized as
basic norms.7' The idea of objective rights is the most fundamental
difference between the American and German constitutions.' The
objective dimension of basic rights is tied to the value-ordered nature
of the German constitutional scheme, obligating government to realize
in society the set of objective values embodied in the Basic Law. 2
"This value-system, which centers upon human dignity and the free
unfolding of the human personality within the social community, must
be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all
areas of law, public and private., 73  By interpreting basic rights as
establishing an "objective" ordering of values centered around human
dignity, the Constitutional Court transformed those values into
principles so important that they must exist "objectively" as an
independent force, separate from their specific manifestation in a
concrete legal relationship. 4 So conceived, objective rights form part
of the fundamental legal order, the ordrepublic, thereby becoming part
of the governing principles of German society.75
A second contrast to the American Constitution involves the
German theory of third-party effect (Dittwirkung), under which the
constitutional order affects private legal relationships as well as public
ones.76  The theory flows from the famous Liith case, where the
Constitutional Court reasoned that because basic rights are essential to
the public good as part of the objective order of fundamental principles
that rule society, basic rights must affect private legal relationships as
well as public ones.77 The Court determined that the Basic Law should
70. This section is derived from and elaborated on in more detail in EBERLE, supra
note 10, at 25-32; Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity Pnvacy, and Personality in German and
American ConstitutionalLaw, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 963,967-71.
71. EBERLE, supmanote 10, at25.
72. Id
73. Id (translating Lith, BVerfGE 7, 198 (205) (1958)). The principle of the
Constitution being anchored to this value system was confirmed with respect to Article Four
religious freedoms in Tobacco Atheis4 BVerfGE 12, 1 (1960). In Tobacco Atheis4 the Court
upheld the denial of parole to an inmate who attempted to bribe fellow inmates by offering to
forswear religion. The Court ruled that Article Four rights to proselytize were protected only
to the extent consistent with the dignity of others. Id. at 2-3.
74. EBERLE, supra note 10, at 25.
75. Id
76. Id. at 27.
77. BVerfGE 7, 198 (205) (1958).
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apply indirectly to private law. By indirect application, the Court
meant that constitutional norms influence rather than govern private
law norms."
A third contrast to the American Constitution is that the Basic
Law also sets forth certain duties incumbent upon citizens or
government to perform.79 The idea of coupling rights with duties is a
European one, going back to the first continental rights declaration, the
1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen."° The
Basic Law continues this tradition. For example, Article 6(2) provides
that "the care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents
and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over
them in the performance of this duty."8 Articles Six and Seven have a
profound influence on education and religious schooling in Germany.
According to Article 7(1), "[t]he entire schooling system shall be
under the supervision of the state."82
With this background, we now have a better sense of the
constitutional context within which free exercise freedoms operate.
II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The German constitutional order accords broad scope to the
freedom to believe or not believe in God or a philosophical tenet, and
the freedom to act on such belief through free exercise of religion. In
part, this follows from the clear textual mandate of the Basic Law,
which as we have seen, states that "freedom of faith ... conscience...
and creed ... shall be inviolable [and] the undisturbed practice of
religion is guaranteed."83  German constitutional law thus solves
straightforwardly central religious protections along lines that required
Supreme Court elaboration in the United States.84 Explicit protection
of the undisturbed practice of religion was a new development for
78. Id. (explaining that the Basic Law "influences obviously also civil law; no civil
law provision may contradict the Basic Law; all [legal provisions] must be interpreted
consistent with its spirit.... A certain intellectual content 'flows' or 'radiates' from the
constitutional law and into the civil law and affects the interpretation of existing civil law
rules"); see Quint, supm note 10, at 263.
79. EBERLE, supra note 10, at 31.
80. Id.
81. Id (translating GG art. 6(2) (ER.G.)).
82. GG art. 7(1) (ER.G.).
83. Id art. 4.
84. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("Government may neither
compel affirmation of a repugnant belief nor penalize or discriminate against individuals orgroups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities nor employ the taxing
power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views." (citations omitted)).
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Germany, different from the situation under Weimar, where religious
practice could be limited by law.85 The movement toward natural,
inalienable rights is attributable to the reaction against Hitler. By
anchoring the social order to natural principles of justice, the Framers
hoped to better contain the vagaries of human passion." These
principles animate the broad construction of religious freedoms.
Religious freedoms have a very preferred position in the
constellation of values that comprise the constitutional order. The
preference for religion is due in part to textual mandate, as the Basic
Law places no constraint on Article Four freedoms. The Constitutional
Court has facilitated this position of high rank as well. Given that the
architectonic value of the Basic Law is human dignity, and the
unfolding of human personality in accordance with it, human values
and human capacity stand at the very heart of the constitutional order,
as elaborated on by the Constitutional Court. Human spiritual
development and transcendence are indispensable elements of personal
growth. Fortified by these principles, the Constitutional Court has
accorded broad scope to free exercise freedoms.
The preferred position of religion and the correspondingly broad
scope accorded it are notable characteristics of the German
constitutional order. When faced with interests of the general law or
social order asserted in limitation of religious freedoms, the
Constitutional Court has generally preferenced religiously motivated
actions. This dynamic has resulted in a pattern of general
accommodation for people of faith, excusing them from the constraints
of the general law. The Constitutional Court has not interpreted such
freedom as an invitation to disobey the law. The Court's motivation,
rather, is to relieve a person from the dilemma of trying to obey claims
of conscience that conflict with claims of law. The Court has been
careful to limit accommodation to sincerely motivated religious
conduct, and to carve out relief in ways that complement social order.
It is worth observing that the broad, preferred position that
religious claims have in German society stands in sharp contrast to the
state of affairs in the United States under the Supreme Court's
controversial ruling in Smith.88  Under Smith, obligations of the
general law prevail over sincerely motivated religious actions. 9 The
85. Denial of Witness Oath, BVerfGE 33, 23 (29-30) (1972).
86. EBERLE, supra note 10, at 18.
87. Id. at 41-42.
88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
89. Id. at 877-82.
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two countries' contrast over the scope of personal religious freedom is
one of the greatest differences between the laws. We will pursue this
contrast later.
First, we need to get a better sense of the scope of German law.
German free exercise law has three dimensions. First, German law
recognizes personal free exercise liberty which consists of the right to
act on chosen tenets. Here we will concentrate on situations where
religiously motivated conduct clashes with claims of the general law in
order to evaluate an essence of religious freedom and to obtain a sharp
contrast with American law. Second, German law expressly recognizes
conscientious objection from military service,9" an area not directly
addressed by American law. Conscientious objection law is detailed
and complicated, and will not be pursued here." Third, German law
further accommodates religious organizations from claims of the
general law on the ground that they have a right to run their own affairs
autonomously.92 Religious organizations enjoy a broad right of
autonomy over their affairs. For example, a Catholic hospital could
fire a doctor who took a public position on abortion contrary to official
Catholic doctrine and not suffer the consequences normally required
by labor law.93 Or a Protestant church could relieve from his duties a
pastor because he had been elected as a political representative, a
status ordinarily protected by law from impairment.94 The autonomy
of religious bodies to run their affairs is highly developed in Germany
and is generally in accord with the development of American law.95
For considerations of space and scope, we will concentrate mainly on
personal free exercise, discussed against the backdrop of American
law. Further, while the range of free exercise rights in a society can be
rich and varied-consisting of people's daily practices, social
conventions, as well as court cases at all levels--our lens on free
exercise rights will be restricted to the leading decisions of the
countries' Supreme Courts.
90. GG art. 4(3) (F.R.G.).
91. Conscientious objectors must perform alternative service for a period equivalent
to military service. They might work, for example, in hospitals, schools, or other aids to
society. The clause has given rise to significant litigation. See the authorities collected in
CImRiE, supm note 8, at 250 n.36.
92. WRV art. 137 (F.R.G.).
93. Catholic Hosp. Case, BVerfGE 70, 138 (139) (1985).
94. Bremen Pastor Case, BVerfGE 42, 312 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345-46 (1987) (exempting the church from federal
antidiscrimination laws so that it may run autonomously its affairs).
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A. Rumpelkammer
The leading case establishing the scope of Article Four freedoms
is the 1968 case of Rwnpelkammer.96 The controversy concerned a
Roman Catholic youth organization that actively sought to practice its
faith as a missionary in society, trying to realize the ideal of daily life
lived by good deed. At issue was the group's collection of used
clothes, paper, and other recyclable goods for the purpose of raising
money, which it then donated to charitable causes dedicated to the
relief of hunger and misery in underdeveloped countries.97 To further
this effort, the group enlisted the pulpit, calling on priests to urge
parishioners to donate to the cause. These activities raised the ire of a
commercial rag dealer, who complained that the group's activities
illegally competed with his business, which suffered.98 The lower
courts agreed, enjoining the youth organization from engaging in its
clothing drive.
The Constitutional Court disagreed, overturning the injunction on
the basis that it was a violation of the group's Article Four religious
guarantees. Freedom to act and practice religion is central to religious
belief.
The Article Four guarantees of religion-irrespective if the creed is
rooted in religious or nonreligious ideological belief-entail not only
the inner freedom to believe or not believe, that is to profess a particular
creed, or to remain silent or disavow a previously held creed and profess
a new one, but also the freedom to engage in ritual acts, to proselytize,
and to propagandize.... Religious exercise has central meaning for
each faith, and in view of its historical content, must be interpreted
broadly. It includes not only ritualistic acts, like adherence to religious
practices such as worship services, church collections, prayer, receipt of
the sacrament ... but also religious education, religious and atheistic
celebrations and other practices of religious or nonreligious life.99
The broad scope of religious freedom elaborated on by the Court has
its roots especially in the history of religious persecution under Hitler,
the Court observed. °0
The wide berth of religious freedom is available on equal terms to
all faiths and philosophies, not just to Christian churches, which are
96. BVerfGE 24,236 (1968).
97. Id. at 237.
98. The rag dealer argued that enlisting the authority of the Catholic Church in
support of the collection was an unfair business practice. Id at 238-39.
99. Id at 245-46.
100. Id at 245.
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dominant in Germany.' °' In practice, German jurisprudence has
primarily entertained religious belief The principle of equality follows
from the command of religious and ideological neutrality, which the
state is bound by, and the principle of parity of church and creed.' 2
Under these tenets, the state cannot favor or disfavor any religion over
another, or religion over nonreligion. Rather, under the principle of
parity, all beliefs are to be treated equally.' 3 Official neutrality and
parity of faith and creed are indispensable to the guarantee of religious
freedom and are especially pertinent given the increasingly pluralistic
nature of German society. An open, pluralistic democratic society is
the context envisioned for the exercise of basic rights, including
religious rights.'0 4 In these respects, German society mirrors the nature
of American society. Both Courts pitch rights philosophies against the
social background of an open, pluralistic, democratic society. The
movement toward pluralism will put German religious rights to the
test.
Religious freedoms apply to groups as well as to individuals, and
protections further encompass organizations such as the youth group at
the middle of the Rumpelkammercase, which "do not completely, but
only partially further the religious or ideological goals of its
members."'0 5  Decisive for the Court is that religion be a primary
motivation. "The condition [for applicability of Article Four
freedoms] ... is that the purpose of the organization is directed at the
achievement of such [a religious or ideological] goal."'0 6 In American
law, religious rights are one of the few areas where a group dimension
to rights is evident.' 7 It is much more common the case that rights are
conceived in personal terms in the United States. By contrast, the
group dimension to rights is more characteristic of German law, ' and
European law more generally.
101. See id. at 246-47.
102. See id. at 246.
103. See id at 24647. The principles of neutrality and parity follow from the Weimar
period. These principles are even more firmly entrenched in the pluralistic society envisioned
in the Basic Law.
104. Seeid at248.
105. Id. at 246-47.
106. Id. at 247.
107. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 34546 (1987) (exempting the church from federal
antidiscrimination laws so that it may run autonomously its affairs).
108. See, e.g., Auschwitz Lie Case, BVerfGE 90, 241 (251-53) (1994) (holding that
the identity of the Jewish people is bound with the Holocaust as a constituent element of their
human dignity and that, accordingly, such dignitarian rights can limit publication of the
assertion that the Holocaust never occurred).
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Having set out these broad parameters for religious freedoms, the
Court next had to apply them to the facts at hand. The Court found
religious exercise broad in practice, as it had in principle. The key
question for determination was whether the charitable activity, and its
solicitation by pulpit, were religious activities. Because the activities
were economic, they were farther afield of conventional religious acts,
such as taking of the sacrament, worship, or prayer. Decisive for the
Court was the religious motivation that inspired the conduct.
Collecting clothes and material for charitable purposes, and their
solicitation by pulpit, was religious, according to the Court, supported
by Biblical and Christian teaching. 0 9 Religion is not just a spiritual
exercise. Religion includes the freedom to influence the world around
you as well, to act outwardly in accordance with the dictates of your
creed."'
Necessarily, these determinations entailed a judgment by the
Constitutional Court that religious motivation lies at the base of the
charitable activity. The Court's approach seems quite sensible, for how
else is a body to determine whether religious/ideological freedoms are
at issue other than by determining whether the actions under review
are religious/ideological? The Constitutional Court has
straightforwardly gone about the business of determining what is or is
not religious. The matter-of-fact course of the Constitutional Court
contrasts with that of the Supreme Court, which has often expressed
discomfort at judging what is or is not religious."'
The Court saw its obligation as assessing religion or ideological
acts on their own terms. To do this, the Court applied neutral,
generally applicable constitutional criteria. However, the Court
emphasized that fair consideration must be given to the understandings
of the believers at issue. ' 12  This is all the more important in a
pluralistic society, where a range of disparate beliefs are practiced. If
the religious or ideological belief under review is not evaluated on its
own terms, there is a danger that its vision will be lost among the
multitude of voices apparent in pluralistic democracy. Further, there is
danger that the vision will be drowned by the hegemony of dominant
109. Rumpelkammer, BVerfGE 24 at 248.
110. Id
111. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887
(1990) ("[W]e have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a
particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.").
112. Rumpelkammer, BVerfGE 24 at 247-48. "The self-understanding of the religious
and ideological group should not be disregarded in determining, in the individual case, what
qualifies as the exercise of religion and ideology." Id. at 247.
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views that are likely to crystallize as social convention or norms,
making it difficult to get one's tenets communicated or respected.
Viewing religion or ideology from the perspective of the believer is an
important tenet of religious liberty. It is a perspective not notably
present in American law.
The Court determined the activities to be religious and therefore
within the ambit of Article Four protection. Being able to act on one's
beliefs is an important part of religion. "Religious exercise has central
meaning for every faith and creed, and must be broadly interpreted in
view of its historical content.""' 3 Engaging in charitable activities is
one way of realizing faith in daily life. For the Court, this was
decisive, even if such charitable activities might be viewed as standing
somewhat at the outer bound of Article Four freedoms, beyond more
conventional religious rites. For its purposes, the Constitutional Court
deliberately left open determination of the bounds of religious
freedoms, preferring to determine what is protected on a case-by-case
basis, an approach more in keeping with the vicissitudes of an open,
pluralistic society."4 There is always danger in judging freedoms by
the past. Looking backwards can distort views of the present. With
respect to religion, this might have a suffocating effect on new views
of the world beyond.
Having determined that the charitable activities were protected,
the Court next moved to the second part of its methodology, that is,
application of a general balancing of interests test. This test involves a
review of the lower court's decision to ascertain whether the lower
court has given due regard to the rights at issue. Because religion is
defined as an integral component of the constitutional order, it must be
given especially significant weight. The Constitutional Court does not
like to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court's. It prefers to
review the lower court decision only to see whether appropriate weight
was given to constitutional values. However, to the extent the Court
performs a balance or emphasizes the worth of a constitutional value,
some second guessing is inevitable. Under all circumstances, the
lower court must reperform the general balancing of interests upon
remand in accordance with the Court's instructions.
Performing this balance, the Court compared the claims of
religion against the competing demands of the businessman faced with
unwelcome competition to determine which was weightier in the
113. Id. at 246.
114. 1d. at 249.
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circumstance. It was no contest. The preferred value of religion in the
constitutional order took precedence. Hence, the Court lifted the
injunction on the charitable activities. The marketplace had to yield to
the preferred value of religion and adjust accordingly. No person has a
right to participate in the market as they would like."H
5
Our review of Rumpelkammer reveals the main principles of
German law. First, Article Four freedoms are broadly construed. Inner
freedom protects the interior world of the spirit. Outer freedoms
guarantee the ability of a person to act on faith. The ability to
influence the world through religiously motivated action is central.
Second, the protections of religious freedoms are equally open to all,
religious or nonreligious belief, majority or minority creeds. Official
neutrality and parity of creed help to assure fair consideration of
religion/ideology on its own terms and also helps assure a level playing
field in the competition among beliefs for influence. Third, the
Constitutional Court must determine, through constitutional
interpretation, what is or is not religious or ideological for purposes of
Article Four. Fourth, once an activity is determined to be religious and
the claimant's exercise thereof is burdened, religious rights must be
balanced against the claim or claims of the social order asserted in
limitation. In performing this balance, the Court gives wide preference
to religion consistent with its place as a preferred value in the
constellation of values that comprise the constitutional order. Fifth, it
is thus clear that religious activities will be presumptively protected
and that their accommodation will generally occur in the social order
as a sign of due respect for their importance. This methodology has
wide implications.
Viewed in comparison to American law, the methodology of
Rumpelkammer is much more akin to the approach of the Supreme
Court under Sherbert 6 than Smith."7 Similar to Rumpelkammer, the
Supreme Court under Sherbert must first determine that the activities
at issue are religiously motivated and that the legal measure under
review burdens the exercise of those freedoms. Once it is determined
that religious freedoms are at issue and that they are burdened, then
they are to be preferred and ordinarily will prevail unless the state can
demonstrate an overriding or compelling reason. Under the German
methodology, this balance is achieved pursuant to the general
balancing of interests test. Under Sherbert, the Court employs strict
115. dat251.
116. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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scrutiny analysis."' While the methodologies of the two Courts are
thus similar, the Courts differ in the range of their application of the
methodologies. Under Sherbert, the Supreme Court has only rarely
granted an accommodation."' The Constitutional Court has been far
more accommodating of religion, as we shall see.
As in the sharp contrast in approach between Sherbert and Smith,
the approach of the Constitutional Court aligns much more with
Sherbert than Smith for essentially the same reasons that the two
Supreme Court cases differ. First, unlike Smith and like Sherbert, the
Constitutional Court accords religious freedom preferred status
through the methodology it employs to gauge the relative importance
of the values at issue. Because religious freedoms are valued as
preferred manifestations of human dignity, the Constitutional Court is
unwilling to subject them to the vagaries of the political process. By
contrast, the Smith Court is willing to allow the political process to
arbitrate the range of permissible, religiously grounded action because
conduct, religious or otherwise, is subject to the limitations of the
general laws.'2 ° Thus, general laws circumscribe religious freedom.
Second, because religious freedoms are preferred in Germany, the
general law must yield and the social order must accommodate
religious practices. Thus, under the methodology of the Constitutional
118. SherberA 374 U.S. at 403, 406-08 (holding that burdens on free exercise of
religion "may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate' and that "no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights") (citations omitted &
alteration in original)). Justice O'Connor expressed the qualities of strict scrutiny aptly.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have respected both the First
Amendment's express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct
by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated
conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.").
119. As the rule of Sherbert was crafted in the context of a state unemployment
scheme, several cases addressing unemployment likewise resulted in accommodation under
the Sherbert approach. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-35(1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981). In addition, Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205(1972), employed generally the Sherbert approach in deciding that the old world Amish could
be excused from sending their children to school beyond the eighth grade despite Wisconsin
state law requiring attendance through high school. Id. at 219-36.
120. 494 U.S. at 890:
It may be fairly said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
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Court, there is no place for application of neutral, generally applicable
laws over and above religious freedom, the approach of Smith. There
is a world of difference between an approach that carves out religious
freedom as a haven amidst the wide expanse of general laws and one
that insists upon obedience to general laws, notwithstanding the
demands of inner conscience.
We might say the German approach accords high respect to the
dictates of conscience, whereas the Smith approach forces a conflict
between the demands of law and faith. John Locke posed the conflict
in a way similar to Justice Scalia in Smith.'21 And Locke had a
decisive influence on Thomas Jefferson, who largely echoed the
position of Locke concerning accommodation of religious conduct.'
121. Like Roger Williams, Locke attempted to protect religious liberty by separating
the jurisdictions of government from religion to the extent possible so that the two would not
intrude upon the realm of the other. "I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish
exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that
lie between the one and the other." LOCKE, supra note 62, at 18; see id at 18-19, 32, 47, 56.
However, when faced with a conflict between the two, government would prevail. "[T]he
private judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public
good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation." Id at 59.
[T]hose things that are prejudicial to the commonwealth of a people in their
ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be
permitted to churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be
very careful that he do not misuse his authority, to the oppression of any church,
under pretense of public good.
Id. at 48-49. For careful consideration of the thought of John Locke, see Timothy L. Hall,
Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REv. 455, 490-95
(1991); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1430-36. For careful consideration of the thought of
Roger Williams, see Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gill: Religious Freedom in America,
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 425,438-63 (1999).
122. "[T]he opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its
jurisdiction ... it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers
to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order .... "
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 346, 347 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, WRITINGS]. "The
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others." THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press
1955) (1787). "[T]he legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions
... [M]an ... has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association,
in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supn3, at 510,
510. Jefferson largely conceived freedom as belief and opinion, and not acts, which civil
government was free to regulate.
Based upon Jefferson's distinction between beliefs (protected) and actions (unprotected),
the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v United States; 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), holding that
Mormons were not excused from polygamy laws. For careful consideration of Jefferson's
thought, see Hall, supra note 121, at 495-505; McConnell, supra note 14, at 1430-31, 1449-
52.
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Like Locke and Jefferson, Justice Scalia envisions religious freedoms
as encompassing the freedom to believe what you like.'23 However,
religiously grounded conduct is limited by law. When faced with that
situation, Locke advocated that a person should follow his or her
conscience and accept the consequences of breaking the law. '2 Smith
is an outcropping of Lockean thought.
No doubt, the specific textual mandate of religious freedom in
the two constitutions reasonably preferences religion. Thus, a person
acting pursuant to religious conviction should be excused from trying
to satisfy claims of law and conscience, as James Madison argued.'25
The approach of Sherbert and the German Constitutional Court is in
line with Madisonian thinking. There is much more to say about these
general approaches to claims of conscience. But we are getting ahead
123. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 ("[F]ree exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the
right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.").
124.
[Olbediance is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the laws .... "What
if the magistrate should enjoin any thing by his authority, that appears unlawful to
the conscience of a private person?" . .. I say, that such a private person is to
abstain from the actions that he judges unlawful; and he is to undergo the
punishment, which is not unlawful for him to bear; for the private judgment of any
person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does not
take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation.
LOCKE, supra note 62, at 59. "Who shall be judge between them? I answer God alone; for
there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people.... You will say
then the magistrate being the stronger will have his will, and carry his point. Without doubt."
Id at61.
125. According to James Madison:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This
right is in its nature an unalienable right.... It is unalienable also; because what is
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man
to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty [to the Creator] is precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.... We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society....
MADISON, supa note 5, repinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 64 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). At times, Madison expressed quite radical positions. Early in his
public life, Madison posited that government should be able to limit religious liberty only
when "the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the state are manifestly
endangered." TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 135 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Later in life, Madison
expressed similar thoughts. Religious rights should prevail "in every case where it does not
trespass on private rights or the public peace." Letter from James Madison to Edward
Livingston (July 10, 1822), h7 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1910). For a detailed consideration of Madison's thought, see Hall, supm note 121, at
505-13; McConnell, supmrnote 14, at 1453-55, 1464.
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of ourselves. We need to examine further German law to gain greater
insight into its contrast with American law.
B. Blood Transfusion
The degree to which German law is willing to accommodate a
person's exercise of religious freedom is perhaps best illustrated by the
Blood Transfusion case.'26 The facts are heart-rending, posing a stark
choice between the claims of conscience and law. A married couple
were members of a dedicated evangelical brotherhood that relied on
God to take care of all their worldly problems. Consistent with this
belief, the group refused medical treatment as a practice, putting their
faith in God. After the wife had her fourth child, she had severe blood
loss. A blood transfusion was recommended. After discussion among
themselves and consultation with doctors, the couple decided to forego
the blood transfusion, placing their faith in God to heal her. The
woman was fully conscious and understood the consequences of her
decision up until the moment she died, due to loss of blood.2'7
The husband did not act to hospitalize or otherwise seek medical
treatment for his wife. He wanted to respect his wife's wishes. The
state brought charges of neglect against the husband. He was
convicted and was sentenced to eight months in prison.'
The stark question for the Constitutional Court was whether such
obviously religiously motivated action could be limited by concerns of
health and life, mediated here by the criminal law. As with
Rumpelkammer, Blood Transfusion is a landmark case, and it is
worthwhile to study the Court's construction of religious freedom.
Religious freedoms are particularly valued manifestations of
human dignity and, therefore, are to be broadly construed in the
German constitutional order, as we have learned.
In a state anchored to human dignity as the ultimate value, and in
which individual self-determination is likewise acknowledged as a
common value, freedom of belief guarantees individuals a protected
sphere against state incursion, in which people can freely form their
lives according to their beliefs. In this way, freedom of belief is more
than religious tolerance, i.e., mere tolerance of religious or nonreligious
conviction. Religious freedoms embrace not only the inner freedom to
believe or not believe, but also the outer freedom to manifest faith in
life, to profess, and to proselytize. Also included is the right of
126. BVerfGE32,98(1971).
127. Id at 99.
128. Id.
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individuals to orient their whole lives on the lessons of faith and their
inner convictions. 
1 29
The Constitutional Court's estimation of the value order as
centered on human dignity facilitates the central focus of German law:
nourishing the ideal of men and women as self-responsible, free
personalities developing within the social order.'30 The role of
religious rights within this strategy is to enable people to unfold human
capacity according to the needs of inner conviction and spirit.
Religious rights are especially valued in this regard, as they constitute
some essential part of the innermost soul of men and women.
The high valuation of religious freedom can be acknowledged in
another regard as well. Unlike most of the basic rights contained
within the Basic Law, Article Four religious freedoms are textually
unbounded, a status few rights have.' Thus, as a matter of
constitutional architecture, individual religious freedoms constitute
part of the very essence of the constitutional value order.'32 Under this
construct, the interests of the general law will ordinarily yield to the
preferred constitutional value of religion.
In view of these principles, the result of Blood Transfusion is
predictable. There was no real question that the husband's conduct
(and for that matter the wife's) was religiously motivated and,
therefore, within the ambit of Article Four religious freedoms.
Contrapoised against the preferred value of religion was the limitation
of the criminal law. The Court recognized that this placed the husband
in a difficult, seemingly irresolvable, conflict of conscience. "He was
put in a situation that tested the limits, in which the general legal order
posed a conflict with the command of his personal beliefs, and he felt
the obligation here to follow the higher command of conscience."'33 In
view of the centrality of man and woman developing freely according
to the dictates of human dignity, precisely such a conflict is one that
the constitutional order is designed to remove:
129. Seeid.at 106.
130. Id at 107-08.
131. Note again that the main communication freedoms of Article Five are limited by
"the provisions of general laws, ... protection of young persons, and the right to personal
honor." GG art. 5(2) (ER.G.). By contrast, artistic and scientific freedoms, like religion, are
unlimited by the text. Id art. 5(3) (ER.G.).
132. CfBVerfGE 32 at 108.
133. Id at 109. The United States Supreme Court framed the relevant conflict
similarly. "The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
1050 [Vol. 78:1023
2004] RELIGIONJNGERMANYAND UNITED STATES 1051
All state power must respect to the utmost degree religious
conviction.... Thus, criminal law must yield, when its application leads
to a concrete conflict between ... legal obligations and a command of
conscience that places the person in mental distress over being labeled a
criminal that predominantly stigmatizes him socially and therefore
violates his human dignity.
134
Accordingly, the requirements of criminal law must be suspended in
situations where they pose direct conflicts with religious convictions.'35
Applying these teachings, the Constitutional Court released the
husband from any criminal sanction, finding that the lower court had
not adequately respected the freedoms of Article Four. The couple
appreciated the physical danger the wife was in. Nevertheless, they
believed God would take care of them. Their religious conviction must
be respected.'36 Moreover, the decision was one the wife made with
full awareness; it was unfair to punish the husband for her decision.
"A marriage consists of two autonomous people each with the right to
free unfolding of personality."' 13 7 Ultimately, the decision was hers, and
hers alone, to make.
Measured against American law, Blood Transfusion is a sharp
contrast with prevailing American authority'38 and also with the
Supreme Court's approach in Smith. Blood Transfusion and American
cases pose exactly the same conflict: religious conviction juxtaposed
against life. Blood Transfusion and Smith pose essentially the same
conflict: religious conviction juxtaposed against obligations of the
criminal law. The Constitutional Court resolves the conflict exactly
opposite of the Supreme Court and most American lower courts. The
weight of American authority overrides religious conviction in favor of
life. In Smith, the Supreme Court determined that religious conviction
134. BVerfGE 32 at 109.
135. Despite the Constitutional Court's statements that criminal laws must be
suspended in the face of religious conviction, it is doubtful such will always be the case.
Criminal laws yet apply to religious actors, and it is unrealistic to think that all criminal laws
will be suspended in favor of conscience motivated action. See I DAS BONNER
GRUNDGESETZ: PRkAMBEL, ARTIKEL 1 BiS 19, 519-20 (Christian Starck ed., 1999).
136. BVerfGE32at 110.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Inre President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 E2d 1000,
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (allowing a hospital to administer a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's
Witness, over her and her husband's objections for religious reasons); John F. Kennedy Mem'l
Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971) (authorizing the state to perform an operation and
blood transfusion on a Jehovah's Witness, despite lack of consent, to save a life), overruled by
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985). But see Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.
2d 96, 101-02 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the state violated the religious rights of a Jehovah's
Witness in administering a blood transfusion over that person's objections).
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is no excuse for disobeying the law, especially the criminal law.'39
Thus, the Supreme Court brushed over the religious motivation of the
conduct, fearing otherwise that "conscience [will be ] ... a law unto
itself."' 4  The Court seems to prefer law and order-security and
predictability-to the unpredictable and disruptive influence that
exercise of religious rights can have.' 4' Consistent with the position of
John Locke, the general law should prevail over religious conviction in
the social order. As a matter of personal choice, a religious person
should follow the dictates of conscience and pay the price for
disobeying the law. In essence, the message is: go to jail for
conscience, as the husband in Blood Transfusion was prepared to do.
By contrast, we can now see that the Constitutional Court
unravels the conflict exactly opposite. In situations of conflict,
religious freedoms are to be preferred to the extent possible over the
obligations of the general law, including those of the criminal law, so
that a person can freely pursue his destiny as empowered by his
inalienable rights. Contrasted with Smith, Blood Transfusion is all the
more remarkable in that the nature of the conduct sought to be
discouraged was so much more severe. A human death, albeit
resulting from the victim's own will and nonaction of the actor, is far
more serious than a man's use of peyote. We might use this contrast to
illustrate the lengths to which German law is willing to accommodate
religious conviction, especially when viewed against the weight of
American authority. Conversely, we might observe how skittish the
Supreme Court seems over giving religion its proper due, perhaps
fearing too much the disorder that might be unleashed within society
by religious conscientious objection.
In all respects, Blood Transfusion fits the pattern of German law
and brings into central focus the conflict that can arise between claims
of conscience and claims of law. As a matter of methodology, a
claimant must show that his or her religion is burdened. Once a
burden on religion is demonstrated, accommodation must be made
within society unless strong considerations suggest otherwise. In
Rumpelkammer, the accommodation affected the marketplace. In
Blood Transfusion, accommodation affected the criminal law. We will
139. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
140. Id at 890.
141. Thomas Jefferson feared the irrationality and zeal of religion as well. He
preferred rational religion, like Unitarianism, his ideal of sensible religion. McConnell, supm
note 14, at 1450. He called the idea of the holy trinity "unintelligible Athanasian jargon."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wells and Lilly (Apr. 1818), n JEFFERSON, WITRINGS, supra
note 122, at 1413, 1413.
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soon review other illustrations of accommodating religious conviction,
including with respect to judicial process, political qualification, and
laws respecting animals. Suspension of the general law illuminates the
point of German law: human beings are to be accorded high respect in
the pursuit of their dignity-which they fundamentally determine-
especially over affairs of the soul. Respect of the human being is one
essence of constitutional democracy.
C Denial of Oaths
The pattern of granting people motivated by religious conviction
accommodation from requirements of the general law is further
evident in a set of cases where people refused to take oaths that
ordinarily were required as qualifications to perform duties under the
law. In Denial of Witness Oath, an evangelical priest refused to be
sworn in as a witness to a court proceeding because of his conviction
that the Bible prohibited the taking of oaths.' 42 To swear an oath was to
blaspheme God. In a similar manner, in the Bavarian Official Oath
case a man elected as an alternate representative to local government
in Bavaria refused to be sworn in under the required oath because of
his religious conviction as well.' 43 In both cases, the Constitutional
Court accommodated the objectors, realizing that compelling the oath
constituted coercion of conscience. The approach of the Court is along
the lines of the seminal Supreme Court case of West Virginia State
Board of Education v Barnette, where the Court recognized, upon
second thought,'" that forcing the pledge of allegiance on unwilling
believers was a cardinal violation of a free democratic order. 45
Protection against compelled oaths is built into the architecture of
the Basic Law, as in the United States Constitution.14 The design of
both charters grants broad relief from the requirement of taking oaths,
usefully obviating a case-by-case assessment of these issues. Article
142. BVerfGE 33, 23 (1972).
143. BVerfGE 79, 69 (1988).
144. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
145. 319 U.S. at 633-34.
146. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 494-95 (1961) (ruling it unconstitutional for Maryland to deny an official notary
public office for refusing to take an oath affirming belief in God, as required by the Maryland
constitution). The issue of exempting religiously motivated people from required oaths arose
in early, preconstitutional America. This is especially notable in that there were few
occasions testing the scope of free exercise freedoms. Most colonies allowed religious
exceptions to oath requirements. McConnell, supm note 14, at 1466-68.
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140 of the Basic Law incorporates the Weimar constitutional provision
that no one can be compelled to render a religious oath against his or
her will.'47 Articles 56 and 64(2) of the Basic Law declare that the
Federal President, Chancellor, and federal ministers, respectively,
assume office upon taking an oath, but that the oath can be religious or
nonreligious. Release from the taking of prescribed oaths is thus very
much in accord with the design of the Basic Law.
1. Denial of Witness Oath
In Denil of Witness Oath, there was no doubt that the pastor's
refusal to take the oath was religiously motivated. The pastor felt that
taking the oath was a violation of Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the
Mount. 14  The Constitutional Court thus had little difficulty in
determining that his decision not to take an oath was a central aspect of
religious freedom guaranteed in Article Four.
The conflict posed was between religious conviction and
assurance of truth, solemnity, and fairness in the judicial process,
which the required oath was designed to facilitate.'49 The interests of
civil justice are unquestionably important. Yet, the Court concluded
that the values of religious conviction are more important. Thus, the
Court, in a five-to-two decision, 5° ruled that religious objectors must
be exempted from the necessity of taking oaths. "The state must allow
an exception here, in order to fulfill the guarantee of the [Article Four]
right, to avoid placing the person in an unavoidable conflict in his
spiritual-moral existence as an autonomous person between state
commands [of law] and commands of faith."''
The exemption is available to anyone motivated by genuine
religious or ideological conviction. "The state is not qualified to judge
the correctness or falsity of anyone's religious conviction."'52 Rather,
the state must be neutral and tolerant with respect to claims of religion
or ideology. "The command of official tolerance in questions of faith
and ideology applies especially to minorities and sects, which
147. GG art. 140 (ER.G.) (incorporating WRV art. 136(4) (ER.G.)).
148. BVerfGE 33 at 28.
149. Id. at 30.
150. The dissent reasoned that the rendering of an oath was an indispensable element
of the constitutional order, binding the oath-taker and the state to principles of justice and
God, and therefore necessary to the administration of justice. Taking of the oath was thus to
be preferred over the religious convictions of the pastor. Only those sects that had a long-
standing history of dispensation from the taking of oaths should be excused. Id at 35-42.
151. Idat32.
152. Id at 30.
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experience shows are not ordinarily given much due.""'5 Thus, the
Court ordered the legislature to enact a law allowing for conscience-
motivated exemptions.
In its methodology and result, Denial of Witness Oath fits the
pattern of German law, as we have observed. Once the Court
determined that the motivation of the pastor was religious, it identified
the conflict as one between religious freedom and obligations of the
law. With the conflict in full view, the Court takes the next step and
accommodates religious practice against the claims of the general law.
In the case, the pastor must be exempted from the general requirement
that witnesses in judicial proceedings render an oath prior to testifying
in order to relieve the pastor from the conflict. Freed of the conflict,
the pastor can then act fully on the dictates of conscience.
2. Bavarian Official Oath
The Bavarian Official Oath case builds on the principle of Denial
of Witness Oath. Like that case, the elected official felt commanded
by religious scripture not to participate in an oath that was required as
part of the ceremony to assume political office.'54 He had been elected
to serve as an alternate representative to a Bavarian state office. He
wanted to serve in office, but was denied that privilege because of his
refusal to take the oath. 155
The Constitutional Court resolved the dilemma, on a five-to-three
basis, along the lines of its resolution in Denial of Witness Oath. It is a
cardinal violation of the German Constitution to place a person in the
position of choosing fidelity to conscience or law. Animated by the
seminal value of human dignity, the only reasonable course is to
remove the dilemma by suspending the legal requirement that caused
it, allowing the person to follow freely the claims of conscience.
Accordingly, the requirement of taking the oath prior to assuming
office must be suspended so that the man can follow his conscience
and his political career. Besides, alternative means were available to
153. Id. at 32.
154. The Court had no difficulty determining his religious conviction. Bavarian
Official Oath, BVerfGE 79,69 (76) (1988).
155. Id. at 70-71. American law comes out similarly. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 629 (1978) (striking down a law prohibiting ministers from serving as delegates to the
constitutional convention).
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attest to a representative's belief in the constitutional order.' Thus,
granting an accommodation was not difficult.
D Ritual Slaughter
Ritual Slaughter involved a Turkish citizen of Sunni Orthodox
Muslim faith who had lived in Germany for the last twenty years as
one of the many guest workers (Gastarbeitel) who populated Germany
during its labor shortage after World War II and contributed to the
economic miracle of West Germany.'57 He was descended from one of
these guest workers (as well), inheriting a butcher shop from his
father.'58 Free exercise rights are not confined to citizens, but apply to
aliens as well. He desired to practice his craft of butchering according
to his belief in Islamic slaughter rites for which he had a dedicated
clientele. According to his belief, it is necessary to slaughter animals
quickly and painlessly. The Islamic rite is akin to kosher butchering
(Sch chten).'59
The problem for the butcher was that the craft of butchering, like
so many aspects of German and European Union life, was heavily
regulated. The German law reflected high regard for the welfare of
animals, if such a thing may be said about the act of slaughtering. "
Under the German law, animals were to be stunned first and then
killed as a way of making death as painless as possible. The Turkish
butcher refused to comply with the law, viewing it to be contrary to
Islamic teaching.
The law had contemplated just such circumstances, carving out
exceptions for those motivated by religion. The people contemplated
by such accommodation, in fact, were Jewish and Islamic believers. 6'
156. The representative was prepared to confirm the substance of the oath in a
ceremonial way, without actually having to take the oath. See Bavaran 01ffcial, BVerfGE 79
at 77.
157. BVerfGE 104,337(2002).
158. Id at 340.
159. Cf id at 338.
160. Germany recently incorporated into the Basic Law a provision empowering the
state to protect natural foundations of life, including animal life. The provision, Article 20(A)
of the Basic Law, provides: "Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the
state shall protect the natural bases of life by legislation and, in accordance with law andjustice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order."
GG art. 20(A) (F.R.G.).
161. Kosher butchering (Schi'chten) was previously widely exempted from the general
law in Germany that animals first be stunned prior to being slaughtered. With the rise of
Nazism, these exemptions were removed as part of the persecution of Jews. After World War
II, there was only piecemeal, state-by-state regulation of slaughter, although the practice was
widely tolerated. The federal law of 1986 at issue in Ritual Slaughter was the first
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However, to get such an accommodation, it was necessary first to
acquire permission from relevant religious authorities. The Turkish
butcher had no such official permission. '  Evidence indicated that
prevailing Sunni opinion did not require that meat be prepared
according to the rite the Turkish butcher practiced.'63 Lacking official
permission, German authorities and courts enjoined the butcher from
practicing his craft according to his chosen creed.
Ritual Slaughter thus raised a number of important issues for
religious freedom in Germany. First, the case is among the most
recently decided major cases of the Constitutional Court, and thus
illustrates how free exercise freedoms are conceived in contemporary
Germany. Second, the case involved the practice of Islam, a growing
force in Germany, but yet a minority religion in relation to the
predominantly Christian character of the country. Third, the case also
involved a diversity of views within the Islamic community, forcing
the Constitutional Court to confront a range of beliefs over what Islam
is. In view of the increasingly pluralistic nature of German society,
these were extremely crucial questions in need of an answer.
Because enjoining his craft in his chosen way impeded his
personal freedom, Article Two personality rights were at issue as well
as Article Four free exercise claims. Article Two personality rights are
always available as a catchall for dimensions of personal freedom not
countrywide treatment of the issue in modem times. See Ritual Slaughter, BVerfGE 104 at
338.
162. The Turkish butcher had obtained permits in the past to engage in ritual
butchering. However, these permits were granted before the law went into effect and before
the decision of the Federal Administrative Court enjoining the practice. Under the law,
accommodations could be granted when religious authorities determined that the ritual was
mandatorily required by the religion. In this altered legal situation, officials would not grant
the permit. Id at 33941.
163. Id at 340-41. The Federal Administrative Court deferred to a lower appellate
administrative court opinion, which relied on the opinion of a Sunni expert in Cairo for its
determination that the rite desired by the Turkish butcher was not required as a matter of faith.
According to this expert, Muslims consumed meat whether or not prepared pursuant to the
ritual. According to the Muslim council in Germany, however, the rite was required. The
Muslim council in Germany believed that the proper interpretation of the expert from Cairo
was that the rite could be dispensed with in an emergency.
Muslims do not organize themselves into a hierarchical structure which can set and
manage policy for the religion as a whole. The lack of organizational hierarchy makes it
difficult for European countries, like Germany and France, which are accustomed to
negotiating with representatives of a religion, to reach accords. Katherine Pratt Ewing,
Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship between "Church"
and "'State" in Gennany and France, DAEDALUS, Fall 2000, at 31, 35-40. In Germany, a
representative of the religion is needed to form a public corporation, determine religious
instruction in the public schools or other religious matters. Robbers, supra note 32, at 657.
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captured by more specific basic rights.' 64 Likewise, because the
prohibition impacted on his profession, Article Twelve occupational
freedoms were at stake as well. However, the Constitutional Court
applied the plain language of the Article to hold that occupational
freedoms applied only to Germans. 165
Centrally, however, Ritual Slaughter concerned free exercise
rights, and that is how the Constitutional Court evaluated it. The Court
cut to the chase. At issue here was the ability of the Muslim butcher to
practice his creed according to his belief. Individual exercise of
religious belief is a core manifestation of the personal vision of human
existence that emanates from the ultimate constitutional value of
human dignity. So viewed, what is important is that the personal
vision prevail, not technical legal requirements. Thus, for the Court it
was less significant that the butcher had not obtained required
permissions from religious authorities. More significant was the
underlying religious motivation for the butcher's actions.
Further, preparation and consumption of meat prepared according
to this Islamic rite was a central religious experience for a whole
community of believers formed by the butcher and his customers. The
butcher and his customers fervently believed in this ritual butchering
as central to their daily lives. It was important to recognize the
religious convictions of these believers so that they might live life
according to their creed, even if other Muslims believed differently. In
so doing, the Constitutional Court recognized a diversity of belief
within the Islamic community.166
Recognition of alternative, and competing, communities of faith,
even within a particular religion, is an important principle of religious
freedom. First, the principle acknowledges the validity of belief from
the perspective of the believer, as compared to the body that
hierarchically or organizationally may stand to administer the faith.
The orientation toward individual belief seems more in keeping with
principles of religious freedom and individual rights. Second,
providing for the possibility of competing communities of faith
facilitates an open contest for multiple claims of truth and conviction
to set forth their tenets. The success on earth of any creed will be
164. The case of Eppler cemented the view that Article Two always exists as a reserve
of personal freedom to protect activities that do not fit in the more particular enunciation offreedoms in the Basic Law. BVerfGE 54, 148 (153) (1980). For development of this idea,
see EBERLE, supra note 10, at 62-63.
165. Ritual Slaughter, BVerfGE 104 at 346. Instead, the Court valued the
occupational freedom issue under the Article Two personality right catchall.
166. Id at 354.
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determined by how many adherents it attracts. Third, competition
between communities of faith is, by definition, open to the new and
the different. Minorities or dissenting voices thereby encounter a more
hospitable environment. They have a better chance of advancing their
claims and achieving success by the strength of their creeds. This is in
keeping with the origins of religion, most of which had their start in a
position of dissent, gaining success later. In these respects, the
Constitutional Court has designed an approach sensitive to minorities'
exercise of religious liberty.
Facilitation of diversity of religious faith logically serves to
protect religious freedom as well. Guaranteeing every person the
ability to believe what they like and to act on such belief engenders
broad respect for religious liberty. Vigorous religious rights will act as
a bulwark against government, as citizens will voice objection to
government curtailment of liberty. In a country of diverse religious
beliefs, it will be hard for any one group to impose its beliefs on
another. '67 James Madison advocated diversity in religious belief as
security for civil rights and as security for peace and stability in a
republic. 1
61
It was not always so in Germany. Authorities sometimes treated
Islam as a threat to society because of their perception that the religion
was fundamentalist, antidemocratic, and hostile to human rights,
especially the equality of women. Germans feel especially vulnerable
to perceived threats in view of their past history of political instability
during the Weimar democracy, which aided the rise of totalitarian
Nazism. These perceptions may help explain the authorities'
reluctance to facilitate public practice of Islam, such as the building of
recognizable mosques, public broadcasting of calls to prayer through
loud speakers, and freedom of Muslim women and girls to cover
themselves. 69 Yet, courts have also accommodated Muslims from
social strictures. For example, courts have allowed Muslim women
167. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1515-16.
168. "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the
Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the
national councils against any danger from that source." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James
Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002). Madison repeated the idea in The Federalist No. 51: "In a
free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It
consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of
sects." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 288 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002). Madison's
theory for protection of religious liberty thus parallels his theory for protection of the republic
against factions, as he famously developed in The Federalist No. 10.
169. Ewing, supra note 163, at 3-4, 7-8. The experience is much the same in France.
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and girls to wear head scarves in the classroom (unlike in France and
Turkey) and exempted girls from compulsory school activities like
gym and swimming classes."' The Constitutional Court has also
recently ruled that a woman of Islamic faith cannot be denied a
position as a public school teacher because she desires to wear a head
scarf while teaching, as discussed more fully next. 7' The integration
of Muslims into German society is a forefront issue.
Within this context of historical German and European treatment
of Islam, Ritual Slaughter stands out in bold relief as a landmark case
on religious liberty, recognizing the principle of religious equality-
that liberty applies equally to majority and minority practitioners, in
deed as well as in word. Similar trends are apparent with respect to
Jehovah's Witnesses 72 and the Baha'i173  Each of these religions is
somewhat exotic when viewed against the traditional Christian culture.
Their favorable treatment attests to the growing climate of hospitality
toward minority creeds and the correspondingly vigorous state of
religious liberty in Germany. On the other hand, Germany still views
Scientology with suspicion, treating it as a cult and a commercial
enterprise, not a religion.
74
The German principles of respect for diverse beliefs had
immediate application in the case. Whether a practice is absolutely
170. Id; see also Wuerth, supra note 30, at 1200-01.
171. Islamic Teacher's Headscarf, 2 BvR 1436/02 (BVerfGE Sept. 24, 2003),
http://bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030603_2bvrl43602.html.
172. Jehovah's Witness, BVerfGE 102, 370 (2000) (ruling that the religion could not
be denied public corporation status under article 137 of the Weimar Constitution on theground that participation in voting was not requisite to prove loyalty to the democratic order).
173. Baha'i, BVerfGE 83, 341 (1991) (ruling that Article Four self-autonomy allows
the Baha'i religion to rule itself as it likes, even when supreme religious authorities outside
Germany order affairs differently than communities within Germany).
174. The German position is similar to that formerly held by the Internal RevenueService, which revoked Scientology's tax exemption for a period of over thirty years because
"even if religious in nature [it was operated] for the enrichment of specific private
individuals." Michael Browne, Comment, Should Germany Stop Worrying and Love theOctopus? Freedom of Religion and the Church of Scientology in Germany and the United
States, 9 IND. IN'r'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 191 (1998) (citation omitted); seeArthur C. Helton& Jochen Miinker, Religion and Persecution: Should the United States Provide Refuge to
German Scientologists9 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 310, 311 (1999).
Recently, the German Office of Finance exempted Scientology from taxes on the basis
of a treaty on double taxation with the United States. German authorities were careful to
observe that the tax ruling did not imply recognition of Scientology as a religion. However,
Scientology officials viewed the ruling as a first step in setting Scientology on the same plane
as other religions in Germany. Steuerbefeiung Fir Scientology, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINEZEITUNG, Feb. 4, 2003, at 2; Scientology ab sofort steuerfrej, SPIEGEL ON-LINE, Feb. 3, 2003,
athttp://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft;0,1518,233557,00.html. Thus, some change in thinking is
apparent concerning Scientology.
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required as a matter of religious belief is less a question to be
determined by religious officials. The question is much more likely to
be answered within the context of a concrete community of
believers."' Mere subjective belief is insufficient. The community
must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the practice is required
by their beliefs.176 Given their sincerity and dedication to ritual
slaughter, the Court was well satisfied that the butcher and his
customers constituted a community that acted according to creed.
Posing the question in this fashion, the Court resolved it in the
now common pattern of free exercise law that we have become
familiar with. Given the clash between exercise of religious freedom
and the constraints of the general law, the proper resolution is
recognition and respect of religious practices even if that requires
accommodation of the general laws. It is improper for the state to
deny legitimate religious claims just because they deviate from
accepted practice.'77 The Constitutional Court was careful to note the
important state interest in preventing needless cruelty to animals.
Animals are accorded high respect in Germany. The purpose of the
law was to recognize animals as mutually living beings, not just
objects.'78  Ethical treatment was the goal. However, the religious
practice at issue had to be given fuller consideration than had been the
case by the lower courts under the general balancing of interests test.
The impact of the law was severe. Without any exception, the butcher
would not be able to practice his craft according to his creed. His
customers would also have difficulty obtaining meat sanctified
according to chosen ritual. Thus, the Constitutional Court concluded,
Article Two personality rights, in conjunction with the more specific
protections of Article Four, had been violated.
In a sense, accommodation of the Turkish butcher was less of a
leap than in the cases previously reviewed. The law recognized a range
of exceptions from the general requirement that a person first stun
animals before killing them, most of which were geared to Jewish and
Islamic believers. Accommodating the butcher could as well fit within
the pattern already recognized within the law.'79
175. Ritual Slaughter, BVerfGE 104, 337 (354) (2002).
176. Id. at 354-55.
177. Id. at 355.
178. Id. at 351.
179. Moreover, the Court noted that the authorities could have given fuller
consideration to the second alternative listed in the law, which granted some discretion to
parties trying to fulfill the aims of the law in making death as painless and quick as possible.
Id. at 351-52.
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But in another sense the case did represent a leap. The
Constitutional Court had the prescience to recognize the inherently
personal nature of the convictions at issue. The Court respected the
choices of the Turkish butcher and his customers on their own terms as
they defined their belief Recognition of such personal conviction was
more important than belief as defined by religious or secular
authorities. Validating the personal quest for faith is central. Thus, we
can see the approach of the Court is one especially sensitive to the
dilemma of individual existence, including the demands of conscience.
Ritual Slaughter contrasts with Smith over the process of
accommodation of religion. In Smith, the Supreme Court viewed the
democratic process as the main avenue for accommodation of religious
belief.'80 Viewing Ritual Slaughter under this construct, one would be
led to argue that democratic decision makers had made all the
accommodations they desired in the law already enacted. The Federal
Administrative Court evaluated the case on this basis. Hence, the
Turkish butcher ought to seek political relief, not judicial relief, as in
Smith. In contrast to the Supreme Court, however, this solution was
not adequate to the Constitutional Court. Religious freedoms are too
precious, and arguably too fragile, to be entrusted to the political
process. It is instead the core of the judicial function to safeguard
these rights, especially when exercised by minorities. Minorities, more
than majorities, need judicial solicitude precisely because minorities
operate under laws made by majorities. Minorities are thus much
more likely to run afoul of convention than majorities. In view of
these concerns, the Constitutional Court's decision was all the more
remarkable in that it further carved out religious freedom in the polity
notwithstanding the significant accommodation already rendered in
the statute.
Notably, German law has been stable and consistent for well over
a thirty-year period, in contrast to the ebb and flow of American law,
from Sherbert to Smith. Fidelity in service of basic human rights is
desirable in a world undergoing severe change caused by forces like
computerization, globalization, multiculturalism, and terrorism. A
second lesson of Ritual Slaughter is that these freedoms apply to all,
minority religions as well as majority. In this respect, the case is
notable in its solicitude for the Turkish minority in Germany, which
has often felt like second-class citizens. Indeed, the Turkish butcher
was a minority believer within a minority faith. Looking forward,
180. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).
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Ritual Slaughter would seem to signal that Germany is equipped to
deal with the demands of minorities to equal religious liberty. In these
respects, Germany seems more attuned to demands of a multicultural
society, a likely product of globalization. By contrast, Smith would
seem to signal the opposite, recognizing that minority religions will
likely suffer under democratic rule while majority religions prosper. 8 '
E. Islamic Teacher's Head Scarf
As this Article was going to press, the Constitutional Court
rendered an important decision on free exercise freedoms, ruling five
to three in a hotly contested case that an Afghani-bom woman of
acquired German citizenship, Fereshta Ludin, could not be denied a
teaching position in the public schools because of her religious
conviction to wear a head scarf while performing her duties.'82 Islamic
Teachers Head Scarf is a long and complicated decision, involving a
constellation of rights that include Article Four religious rights of
students and parents, Article Six parental rights, Article Seven
educational rights, and Article Thirty-three guarantees of equality in
qualification and treatment (including with respect to religion or
philosophical view) as a civil servant, in addition to the prospective
teacher's Article Four free exercise rights. Because of the recent
disposition and complexity of the case, I can only summarily discuss
it. Yet, because Islamic Teachers Head Scarf further substantiates the
Constitutional Court's proactive empowerment of free exercise
freedoms, especially in relation to Germany's rising minority Islamic
population, it is in keeping with trends evident in Ritual Slaughter and
merits some explanation.
The basis for the Constitutional Court's decision was that
religiously compelled dress, such as the wearing of a head scarf, was a
matter of personal free exercise of religion which government,
therefore, could not use as a basis to deny qualification to the civil
service (public school teachers are part of the civil service) under
Article Thirty-three, at least in the absence of an underlying law that
appropriately took into account the range of rights and considerations
at stake in this complicated issue."' In this respect, Islamic Teachers
Head Scarf underscores the continuing flowering of free exercise
freedoms in Germany, especially with respect to minority religions
181. Id.
182. Islamic Teacher's Head Scarf, 2 BvR 1436/02 (BVerfGE Sept. 24, 2003),
http://bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030603_2bvr143602.htnl.
183. Id.
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such as Islam, a major concern of the Court.1 84 On this point, Islamic
Teacher Head Scarf is of a similar tenor to Ritual Slaughter and also
of another recent decision in which the Constitutional Court ruled that
a Turkish shop assistant had been wrongly dismissed for expressing a
desire to wear a head scarf, again for religiously compelled reasons, at
work in the perfume section of a department store.'85 Yet, because the
Court predicated its ruling on the technical point that no law
undergirded the authorities' decision to deny Ludin the teaching
position and further stated that a law that properly considered relevant
rights and interests at issue could result in denial of teaching positions
to people wearing religiously compelled dress, Islamic Teacher Head
Scarf was a quite limited victory for religious freedom, although a
victory indeed for Ludin. 186
The mixed nature of the decision can perhaps best be read as a
tentative attempt to resolve this contentious issue in respect to the far-
reaching role of Islam in Western German society. Islam is relatively
new to Germany, and more broadly Europe, and occidental society is
adjusting to this new phenomenon. Many Germans are anxious about
Islam, not knowing quite how to integrate people of Middle Eastern
faith with Western culture. Germany is in the process of working out
how Islamic minorities can express their identity in secular Western
European society. Germans' multifaceted view of Islam is reflected in
the different perceptions as to what wearing a head scarf represents.
Wearing a head scarf could be interpreted variously as a political
expression of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in contrast to the
secular West; a cultural statement of ethnic identity expressing longing
for the distant homeland; a traditional dress that honors familial ties; a
modem statement of self-determination and identity; a symbol of
subordination of women to men under Islamic law; or a religious
observance."' The Court chose the latter, valuing the dress as
184. See id ("A regulation that prohibits teachers from displaying overtly their
membership in a particular religious community or adherence to beliefs ... is clearly in
tension with especially pronounced growing diversity of religion in society.").
185. SeeTurkish Sales Clerk's Head Scarf, 1 BvR 792/03 (BVerfGE July 30, 2003).
186. In fact, Baden-Wiirttemberg has since enacted a law prohibiting the wearing of
religious garb by public school teachers in classrooms. Tony Szuczka, German State Bans
Head Scarf- Law Bars Teachers from Wearing It., COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Apr. 2, 2004, at
A9. The law of Baden-Wiirttemberg is likely to be the subject of a court case testing its
constitutionality.
187. Islamic Teacher Headscarl, 2 BvR 1436/02 at 13-14. The dissent viewed
wearing of the head scarf as mainly a symbol of subordination of women to men and,
therefore, inconsistent with the equality guarantee of Article Three. Id. at 29.
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religiously compelled based upon Ludin's association of the head scarf
with her Islamic identity. 8
The disputed nature of the ruling left the Court open to heavy
criticism, with justification. ' While it is beneficial for constitutional
democracy to engage its citizens through democratic deliberation over
the meaning of the constitution as much as possible, fundamental
rights are not ordinarily thought to be subject to the majoritarian
process of democracy. In this respect, Islamic Teachers Head Scarf
approximates the line of thinking present in Smith.'9° Given the
complex of rights at stake in Islamic Teachers Head Scarf, however,
there may be greater justification for caution and deference in the case
as compared to Smith.
The majority's recognition of the prospective teacher's free
exercise freedoms seemed to be based on an attempt to understand the
spiritual world of Islamic believers. Recognition of Islamic belief
acknowledges the emerging role Islam now plays in German society.
In turn, these developments led the Court to reassess civil service rules
and state neutrality obligations in religious affairs. Left open was how
multiculturalism would change church-state relations.
188. Id. at 3, 8. In rejecting Ludin's application for a teaching position, school
officials of Baden-wiirttemberg reasoned that display of a head scarf was a political symbol
of cultural separation from western society as well as a religious symbol. Ludin instead
valued the head scarf as an expression of her personality and of her religious faith. Id at 3.
189. It is quite possible that the Constitutional Court acted timidly out of respect for
the democratic process, not wanting to substitute its judgment for democratic deliberation and
decision over such a newly emerging issue as the role of Islam in German society. It is also
possible the Court was meek in reaction to serious and sustained criticism unleashed in
response to the Court's controversial decisions in Sol&ers are Murderers IJ, 22 EUROpAISCHE
GRUNDRECHT ZEITSCHFIFT [EuGRZ] 443 (1995) (protecting freedom of expression to call
soldiers murderers), affirming in substance Soldiers are Murderers I, 45 NJW 2943 (2944)
(1994) (chamber decision), and Krucifix IJ, BVerfGE 93, 1 (1995) (holding the Bavarian-
required display of crucifixes in public schools unconstitutional in the face of a complaint).
The Court distinguished the case from Krucifix Il on the basis that Islamic Teachers Head
Scarf involved an individual's exercise of religion (and therefore was also less likely to be
attributed to state sponsorship) in comparison to the state sponsorship of religion in Krucifix
A, and on the basis that a head scarf could be subject to multiple interpretations, only being a
religious symbol when worn by a believer, in comparison to the cross, which always had the
religious meaning of Christianity. Islamic Teachers Head Scar, 2 BvR 1436/02 at 13. Not
surprisingly, this distinction was not convincing to the dissent. Id. at 27.
In fact, while the majority made the case for distinguishing the two decisions, the
decisions were much alike. First, in both cases students had no choice but to be confronted
with the symbols. Second, a teacher's display of plausibly religious dress might reasonably be
attributed to state sponsorship as well, although indirectly. Third, many observers would view
a head scarf as a religious symbol.
190. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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Traditionally, the state is under an obligation of neutrality in
matters of religion out of concern that state support of particular
religious/ideological views will be coercive to individuals partaking of
state benefits. This principle of neutrality and corresponding posture
of official restraint animates the German civil service. The German
civil service is conceived as an intermediary between the state and
citizens, a facilitator of citizens' rights under the positive dimension of
freedom characteristic of the German constitutional order. For these
reasons, civil servants are traditionally viewed as neutral agents of thelegal order and, therefore, not able to exercise full basic rights in their
official capacity. Proactive exercise of rights by civil servants, it isfeared, would coerce or undermine citizens' exercise of their freedoms.
On this view, Ludin could justifiably be denied a position as a teacher,
for her exercise of free exercise rights would fundamentally violate
civil service norms of neutrality and restraint, as the dissent argued.'9'
But the majority saw it differently. Requiring abstinence from
religiously compelled dress out of concern that display of religious
conviction would coerce students and undermine parental choice was
asking too much of Ludin. She did not totally sacrifice her religious
freedoms at the school door. These freedoms are fundamentally to bedetermined from the perspective of the religious community she is apart of, echoing the fundamental principle of Ritual Slaughter that
religious freedoms are to be judged from the perspective of thebeliever's community of faith.'92 Her community of belief viewed
wearing head scarves as religiously compelled. It was therefore
untenable to place her in a position of choosing her religion or her
job.19
3
These principles follow from the growing diversity among
religions in German society and the way such diversity affects the
classroom. School is the place for exposure to a marketplace ofideas and beliefs.'95 Learning to appreciate difference, respect
alternative beliefs, and achieve toleration as building blocks to
realization of integration of diverse people within society are important
191. Islamic Teacher HeadScarf 2 BvR 1436/02 at 20-25.
192. Id at 11; accordRitual Slaughter, BVerfGE 104,337 (354).193. Islamic Teacher Head Scarf, 2 BvR 1436/02, at 10-11; accord Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (stating that this ruling forces one to choose between
religious precepts and work).
194. Islamic Teacher! Head Scarf 2 BvR 1436/02 at 16.195. Id at 6 ("Schools are no refuge, in which eyes are to be closed from the reality ofa pluralistic society. Rather, schools have the mission to prepare youth for what they will
encounter in society.").
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objectives in constitutional democracy.196  True, overt display of
religious observance in the classroom, especially controversial dress
such as the display of a head scarf, could create conflict between
teachers and students, or among students, or among students and
parents. But to the mind of the Court, it was better to see whether, in
fact, such conflict develops and then resolve it, as compared to
presuming it will occur and prohibiting such dress out of 
such fear.19 7
Underlying the Court's reasoning would appear to be
acknowledgment of Islam as a religion, which the Court seemed
especially eager to respect given its minority status in Germany.
Because Islam is a minority faith, there might be less danger that overt
displays of its observance in classrooms would coerce students. These
factors seem to be an implicit basis by which the majority
distinguished Krucifl"i I There is something fundamentally different
between official accommodation of a minority belief within a
majoritarian Christian culture (Islamic TeacherlT Head Scart as
compared to state sponsorship of the majority faith (Krucifix I), or so
the Court seemed to be saying.
Necessarily, the Court's emphasis on personal freedom and
sectarian diversity, even within public classrooms, called for some
reconception of the role the state plays with respect to religion and,
derivatively, civil service obligations. Rather than strict separation of
church and state, more characteristic of the laciest tradition in France,
the Constitutional Court envisioned the state role to be "not a distant,
absent role ... but rather a respectful, nourishing neutrality"'9' that
accords "equality to the beliefs of all believers, understanding the
attitudes advanced [by people] on equal terms."' 99 Thus, even schools
are "open for religious activity under the principle of an ...
196. Id. at 11-12.
197. Id. at 17. The Court reasoned that if conflicts over the wearing of religious garb
in schools arise, it makes sense to require proof that wearing religious garb influences
students. Id. at 14-15. The dissent valued the situation differently, viewing the display of a
head scarf as fraught with such conflict. Id. at 25-26; see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588
(1992). In Lee v Weisman, the United States Supreme Court noted:
The potential for divisiveness is of particular relevance here [prayer after
graduation] ... because it centers around an overt religious exercise in a secondary
school environment where ... subtle coercive pressures exist and where the student
had no real alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or
appearance of participation.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
198. Islamic Teacher Head Scat, 2 BvR 14363/02, at 4.
199. Id. at 11.
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overlapping, open and respectful neutrality.'2 ° Concretely in the case,
this meant that a prospective teacher could not be refused a position
out of hand for religious conviction to wear certain dress. Likewise,
this more flexible principle of neutrality filtered into civil service
obligations. 0 '
Yet, the Court also recognized that the phenomenon of
multiculturalism might result ultimately in a stricter separation of
church and state in order to prevent discord in society.2 2 Whether this
would come to be or not would depend on how events unfolded. The
contingencies at play in the issue would appear to be a factor in the
Court's preference to have the democratic process be the forum
initially to forge some workable accommodation of the competing
rights and interests at stake. In the case, the absence of such a law
determined the outcome.23 Thus, at bottom, we can see that Islamic
Teacher HeadScatfis a tentative step in determining the role of Islam
in Germany. The case does not resolve definitively the issue of
permissible religious garb in official forums, an additional point of
contention to Court observers.
III. THE MEANING OF FREE EXERCISE
The difference in approach apparent in contemporary German
and American law over the reach of Free Exercise guarantees forces a
consideration of the freedoms protected by a Free Exercise Clause and
their place in constitutional democracy Since German law is more
akin to Sherbert than Smith, the comparison of German law to current
American law mirrors the contrast between Sherbert and Smith. The
debate has been controversial and one with large repercussions.
The debate can be easily summarized. The approach of the
Supreme Court under Sherbert and the German Constitutional Court
can be considered one of advocating Free Exercise freedoms.
Religious claims of conscience are anterior to society.'O4 They are
200. Id at 6.
201. Id at 10. Not surprisingly, the dissent took issue with the majority's conception
of neutrality in church-state relations, and how this affected civil service obligations. Id at
20-24.
202. Id at 16-17.
203. Baden-Wiirttemberg, the German Land at issue in the case, had considered butdetermined not to enact such a law. Id at 30 (dissent). Baden-Wiiruemberg has since
enacted a law banning the wearing of religious garb by public school teachers in classrooms.
Szuczka, supa note 186, at A9.
204. The idea has a long lineage:
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based on God. In the German view, conscience more generally is
transcendent. Claims of the divine are superior to claims of society.
Thus, the scope of Free Exercise rights is defined by religious duties,
not laws of society."' Viewed this way, the Free Exercise Clause
preserves the ability of a person to exercise religion pursuant to his or
her conscience. The express enumeration of Free Exercise rights is a
limitation of government in this regard. We might envision Free
Exercise rights to be an essence on which the social contract is formed,
like other essentials, such as free speech, equality, or separation of
powers.
Based on this philosophy, the realm of religious belief is
indisputably inviolate. A person may believe or not believe or alter
belief on any creed he or she deems appropriate. Because the role of
government is limited in this respect, government must be tolerant of
all beliefs and neutral with respect to them, treating them all equally.
Smith would advocate this approach as well.
The controversy lies over the reach of religiously grounded
conduct. Here the approaches of Sherber/German and Smith diverge.
SherberdGerman advocates protection of religiously inspired action to
the extent it does not threaten important social interests such as health,
safety, welfare, and the like. The Sherber#German approach does not
advocate absolute religious freedom. Absolute religious freedom
could threaten the social order because of the disorder it might
engender. (For example, religiously inspired pogroms, subordination
of infidels, refusal to recognize civil authority or, to take an infamous
historical example, the capturing of the town of Miinster, Germany, by
Anabaptists in 1534, who then persecuted and drove out those who
would not conform to their strict religious order modeled on early
Christianity, striking fear throughout Europe). Rather, religious
freedom is bounded by the social order. Religious values stand at one
The civil sword (therefore) cannot rightfully act either in restraining the
souls of the people from worship or in constraining them to worship, considering
that there is not a title in the New Testament of Christ Jesus that commits the
forming or reforming of His spouse and church to the civil and worldly power.
PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION To THE AMERICAN TRADITION 133
(1965) (quoting Roger Williams). "[C]onscience.... [is] a persuasion fixed in the mind and
heart of man, which enforceth him to judge ... and to do so and so with respect to God, His
worship." Id. at 158-59 (quoting Letter from Roger Williams to Major Endicott, Governor of
Massachusetts (Aug. 165 1)). Liberty of conscience is "precedent, both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society." MADISON, supra note 5, repinted in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 64 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
205. McConnell, supranote 14, at 1512-13.
TULANE LA W REVIEW
end of a pole opposite social interests. Neither has an absolute claim
over the other. Instead, each can make a claim on the other, and we
must figure out a way to determine which will predominate over the
other in the particular circumstance.
To accomplish the proper accommodation of religious freedom in
relation to society, it is sensible to balance values of religious freedom
against the significance of social interests, which ordinarily take form
in society's laws. Because neither religious freedom nor social order
can be absolute, a form of balancing the two values is logical. The
Courts in the United States and in Germany have demonstrated how
such balancing can be accomplished. The approaches are generally
similar. The Supreme Court employs strict scrutiny analysis.2 °6 TheConstitutional Court employs a general balancing of interests test,
familiar enough from our review of German law. The German test
gives due regard to the values of the constitutional order, of which
religious freedom is an integral part, and then considers carefully the
claims of society in relation to religion.
Both the American and German approach accord a preferred
position to religion in this weighing based upon the assumption that
claims of conscience rooted in religion are superior to claims of
society. Where possible, a claim of conscience should prevail over
obligations of the law when the two conflict. Claims of law can
predominate also. However, legal claims must be demonstrated to be
important and crucial to the particular circumstance under review.
Established case law of America and Germany demonstrates amply
how sound accommodations can be reached, accommodations that
sometimes favor religion 207 and sometimes society. 0  As a general rule
of law, it is less important whether religion or social claimspredominate in any case. More important is that due regard is given to
religious freedom, as the polity determines the appropriate place for
religion in a charter committed to religious freedom. Social interests
are always likely to be given serious consideration given the centrifugal
forces of majoritarian rule. It is easier to conform to law than to
206. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403,407 (1963).
207. See, e.g., id; Rumpelkammer, BVerfGE 24, 236 etseq.(1968).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (holding that thegovernment need to assure fiscal integrity of Social Security outweighs an Amish claim for
exception). See also Wuerth, supra note 30, at 1200 n.479, and the authorities cited withinfor a description of German lower courts' rejection of accommodations for Muslims desiring
to slaughter animals without anesthetization (now permitted by the rule of Ritual Slaughter)
and for a Christian student desiring exception from swimming lessons.
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oppose it. Thus, on the whole, religious freedoms are in need of
greater solicitude than social interests.
The approach of Smith differs over how to treat religiously
induced conduct. Such conduct is permissible only to the extent it is
within the scope of the law. When religiously inspired action collides
with generally applicable neutral laws, neutral laws predominate.29
Under the rule of Smith, therefore, the scope of religious action is
determined by the democracy through the enactment of its laws. Law
controls more than religion, an approach opposite of Sherbert. In fact,
we can now see a difference in perspective. The approach of
SherbertGerman is oriented toward the believer; religious duties
control more than the law. Smith is oriented toward the law; law
determines the range of religious freedom. The scope of religious
freedom depends significantly on which perspective controls.
Under Smith, personal religious freedom can fairly accurately be
calibrated along a dichotomy of belief (protected)/action (unprotected),
unless allowed by the polity. The Smith rule thus tends toward being
categorical; protection or nonprotection depends largely on whether
the religious exercise is characterized as belief or action."" In this
respect the Smith rule promotes clarity in the law, in comparison to the
messiness sometimes associated with balancing regimes. Under the
particular balancing regimes of Sherbert and the German
Constitutional Court, however, the rule of law has been fairly
predictable. Thus, the benefits of a categorical rule in promoting
stability in the law are not demonstrably better than that of the
balancing regimes under review in this matter.
Another factor worth considering in assessing approaches to Free
Exercise is promotion of the legal value at issue. Here the legal value
is the constitutionally guaranteed right of religious freedom.
Comparing the scope of freedom under SherbertGerman as compared
to Smith, it is fair to say that the SherbertGerman approach is more
protective of religious freedom. Naturally this would follow from an
approach that protects actions as well as belief, as compared to an
approach that largely protects only belief.
Conversely, it is also illuminating to measure the approaches
from the perspective of how well they facilitate freedom's opposite:
209. Smith is in line with Reynolds v United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and also the
famous position of neutrality advocated by Philip Kurland. See PILIP B. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 112, 115 (1962).
210. Smith thus follows the thought of Thomas Jefferson. See sources cited supra note
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social order. Consideration of order is a relevant concern because
constitutional democracy protects ordered liberty,"' not liberty per se.
Religion is fundamentally a spiritual, mystical phenomenon over
which the believer has little, if any, control. If God commands, there is
little to do but obey. Each person's conscience-the path to God-has
the potential to be a law unto itself, as Justice Scalia aptly observed in
Smith."2 Multiplying conscience by people, any society would have
difficulty securing common peace when faced with a multitude of
consciences. These motivations were a factor in Smith."3 It is fair to
say that the rule of Smith favoring religious actors' compliance with
generally applicable law favors order more than the SherberdGerman
regime where elements of disorder are inevitable-the disorder
resulting from religiously inspired conviction. However, while
concern that promotion of disorder will unravel society is sound as a
theoretical matter, in practice this has been a diminished concern under
the particular regimes of Sherbert and the German Constitutional
Court. Few Free Exercise challenges have been successful under
Sherbert, resulting in minimal conscientious objection. 14  While the
German Court has been more hospitable toward accommodation, no
discernible disorder is apparent in German society. Thus, we might
conclude that these two societies have been successful in containing
the chaos sometimes resulting from religious fervor. Perhaps the
countries might serve as a model as to how constitutional democracy
can contain religious zeal.
Moreover, it is an open question whether tolerance of a certain
disorder is a fair price to be paid for religious freedom. Both
211. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
212. "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself' contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (citation omitted).
213. "Any society adopting such a system [strict scrutiny regime] would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them." Id. at 888. Early
Americans were concerned that accommodations would lead to anarchy as well. McConnell,
supra note 14, at 1447.
214. In fact, American law has settled on accommodation in only two sets of cases.
One instance is the unemployment context, which has resulted in several cases under the
Sherbert approach. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). The other instance is suspension of compulsory high school
attendance in Wisconsin v Yoder, where the Court employed generally the Sherbert
methodology. See406 U.S. 205,215,220-21(1972).
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German 21 and United States 216 societies have illustrated well that such
a price is worth paying for free speech. Thus, we might ask, if speech,
why not religion?
Because the language of Free Exercise protects straightforwardly
free exercise of religion, the purpose of the clause would seem self-
evidently to guarantee religious practice. While allowing religious
practice consistent with the law is better than the alternative, it is not
much of a step for the democracy to tolerate religious exercise
consistent with its general laws. Democracy controls more than
religion. Obviously, both SherberdGerman and Smith promote this.
In constitutional democracy, however, democracy does not control all.
The Constitution does. The acid test of Free Exercise, accordingly, is
to what extent it protects religious practice when such practice
conflicts with legal obligations. This dilemma poses for society the
hard question of which of the two is preferable.
Sherbert and Smith offer alternative solutions to this dilemma.
Under Sherber#German, legal obligations can be suspended in favor
of religious practice.2 7 Freed from the obligations of the law, a person
is then free to act upon God's will. We can see again that the
SherberlGerman approach is rooted in the view that God's claims are
superior to society's. Accordingly, the proper role for a society based
on religious freedom is to get out of the way and defer to a person's
pursuit of divine will. We might say the purpose of Free Exercise, in
this view, is to recognize and empower a person to act on the liberty to
follow religious conviction. Free exercise rights, like other rights,
delimit democracy.
Smith comes out oppositely. Under Smith the dilemma of
whether to follow conscience or law is resolved by mandating
submission to the law over conscience. We might recall that the Smith
approach follows the tenets of John Locke1 8 and Thomas Jefferson. 19
215. E.g., Soldiers are Murderers, I, 22 EuGRZ 443, 456 (1995) (holding that calling
soldiers murderers may be protected expression).
216. Eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-20 (1989) (burning a flag is protected
speech).
217. The best example of this in American law is Yoder, where the Court excused the
Amish from mandatory high school attendance. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-34.
218. Smith's idea of nondiscrimination is grounded in Locke.
Whatsoever is lawful in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magistrate
in the church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary
use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of people for their
religious use.... But those things that are prejudicial to the commonwealth of a
people in their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things
ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred rites.
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Under this view, the role of the polity is to be tolerant and equal. All
faiths are to be tolerated. All faiths are to be treated equally by
officials. All faiths are equal because they are open to all people, and
all people, no matter what faith, must comply with the law. People of
faith are equal to people of nonfaith. No exceptions are to be made
from the law.
However, Smith additionally advocates that the law itself might
reasonably favor or disfavor one religion over another or religion over
nonreligion, although on formally neutral terms. Whatever official
favoritism exists must be manifest in effect, not language. Smith
advocates formal neutrality, not substantive neutrality. This is the
meaning of Justice Scalia's statement that
[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."'
Under Smith, religious majorities are likely to profit through the power
they hold in the political process. Political representatives will tend to
curry favor with dominant elements of their constituency The law will
tend to reflect the interests of these majorities. Thus, it is less likely
religious majorities will be placed in the position of choosing
conscience or law. (For example, the common exemption from
prohibition laws for Catholics performing the communion ritual.) That
fate is one to be faced mainly by religious minorities, who lack the
clout to influence the political process.
Viewed another way, we can see clearly that the choice between
Sherbert and Smith is one between a society preferring conscience or a
society preferring law. The choice, starkly, is between religion or
order. Under SherberdGerman, religion is king. Under Smith, law is
king.22' Law circumscribes religious freedom. Viewed differently,
SherberlGerman places a premium on liberty whereas Smith
emphasizes the equality obtaining from subjecting everyone to
generally applicable neutral laws. Smith is ultimately grounded in law
LoCKE, supm note 62, at 48-49.
219. See sources cited supra note 122.
220. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
221. "The civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the
prince's pleasure, or it can change nothing." LOCKE, supra note 62, at 49.
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and order. We might think of law and order as the price to be paid for
religious tolerance, in a manner similar to John Locke.222
Interpretatively, there are plausible reasons for either the approach
of Sherbert or Smith under the Constitution. Textually viewed,
however, the evidence favors Sherbert because the American text
specifically enumerates Free Exercise. The language choice is not
toleration, belief, or equality. Rather, the text singles out religious
exercise as a preferred freedom.223  The language "free exercise"
strongly connotes action, not mere belief. The Framers deliberately
choose the language "free exercise" over "rights of conscience," which
more naturally would suggest only thought or belief.224 The
Constitution itself does not distinguish between belief or action. A
generally applicable neutral law can impinge on religious freedom as
much as a nonneutral law targeting religion.22' American law
demonstrates both varieties.226 The German text is even clearer; both
belief and action are specifically enumerated.27  Thus, in Germany
there is stronger textual support for a broad scope to religious freedom,
one that encompasses both faith and deed.
Under Smith, the Court reads the text to protect belief and action
to the extent action is not circumscribed by the law. Because generally
applicable laws apply to all equally, religion is no more a subject of
neutral laws than status, gender, or speech. Thus, any effect on religion
222. Locke desired to separate affairs of the church from state as much as possible to
minimize discord in society. He advocated toleration of all beliefs, except for Roman
Catholics (because of their allegiance to the Pope) and atheists (because they could not be
trusted to keep their word), as a way further of defusing the tension between church and state.
However, he advocated parliamentary supremacy as the way to resolve disputes between
church and state and he did not favor accommodation of religiously grounded action. Thus,
we might observe that advocacy of toleration was as far as Locke was willing to go for the
cause of religious liberty. He advocated a much more moderate position than Roger Williams
or James Madison. Likely, Locke feared pushing the cause of religious freedom too far, out
of concern it would trigger a backlash. See id.
223. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224. McConnell, supm note 14, at 1488-89.
225. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("A
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion").
226. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that a neutral
state unemployment compensation law violates religious freedom by placing the believer who
refused on religious grounds to work Saturdays in the position of choosing his religion or his
job), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-40
(1993) (holding that the city's ban on animal sacrifice for ritualistic purposes targeted the
Sanskrit religion).
227. GG art. 4 (ER.G.).
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is incidental, which the Court is willing to accept as a price to be paid
for adherence to a system of formally neutral laws.228
Whether the rule of Sherbert or Smith obtains has consequences
for the role of a Court in constitutional democracy as well. The
Sherbert rule demands a more delicate and complicated judicial role.
It is much more demanding to determine whether an accommodation
is required (Sherber than to refuse accommodation as a matter of
policy (Smith). Before a court can determine whether an
accommodation is required, moreover, it must first decide whether the
actions at issue are religious and, if so, whether they are burdened.
The rule of Smith tactfully avoids most of these difficult
inquiries. Under Smith, the main judicial determinant is whether the
law at issue is neutral. If it is, then it will be upheld. If it is not, then
the law will be presumptively unconstitutional because it targets
religion. Thus, we can see how the Smith rule insulates a court from
most of the hard questions. This is a major impetus for the rule of
Smith. In fact, the rule of Smith would seem to be grounded in a
desire to minimize the role of the judiciary. By avoiding balancing
tests in favor of categorical rules, judicial discretion is minimized.
Cabining judicial discretion likely lies at the root of Smith.
Interestingly, Smith is grounded in a view of legislative supremacy, not
unlike John Locke.2 9  However, we must also consider that the
American republic is constituted on a separation of powers delegated
among three coequal branches, not on the supremacy of the legislature.
In this respect the rule of Smith may be better suited to America's
mother country, England.
All things being equal, it is of course desirable that the court, like
any institution, have an easier job to perform as compared to a harder
one. Degree of difficulty, however, is not the proper question, for
better or worse. The relevant question, rather, is what the constitution
requires. The constitution determines the judicial role.
In the American charter, the text specifies Free Exercise.: °
Reasonably construed, Free Exercise specifies religion as a preferred
activity, as we have observed. Unavoidably, therefore, the Court must
determine what is religious for purposes of the First Amendment, not
228. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78. But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized
Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalies, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 84 (2000) (arguing that Smith
adopts a rational basis standard of review and thus "contradicts the Court's Speech Clause
doctrine governing ... incidental burdens on speech occurring as the result of otherwise
legitimate government regulations of conduct or the time, place, or manner of expression").
229. McConnell, supr note 14, at 1435.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of course for purposes of theology. Necessarily, what is religion is a
difficult judgment. Some relief is offered by virtue of the fact that
many cases present little question that actions are sincerely based on
religion. 3' However, other cases present difficult judgments, offering
judges the opportunity to earn their money. Judgments in these hard
cases map out the border of religious freedom.
It is worth noting, moreover, that Smith does not completely
avoid these questions. Under Smith the Court must determine what is
religious as well, although this may be done implicitly as the Court
focuses on whether the law is neutral or not. The Court's inquiry into
neutrality forces consideration of whether the law targets religion or
not. This inquiry necessarily involves some evaluation of religion.
Luckily, we do not have to search the sky for answers to these
questions. If we did, much ink would have to be spilled. Established
Free Exercise law points the way toward solution.
First, the Supreme Court itself has already mapped out the
contours of the existential question of what is religious under the First
Amendment.232 We might think of ways the Court's exercise can be
improved. 33 But the parameters of the task are set out. The hard
question is understanding the proper judicial role. Determining
whether an activity is religious for purposes of coming within the
ambit of the First Amendment is a different question than determining
the religion itself. The former question must necessarily be answered
as a matter of constitutional law. Determining whether an activity is
"religious" is no different in principle than determining whether an
activity is "speech" for purposes of the Free Speech Clause or
"commerce" for purposes of the Commerce Clause. But the latter
question is inappropriate for judicial resolution. Because the Free
Exercise Clause marks out religion as a special activity, it limits
governmental power over religion. Government is powerless and
incompetent to determine the propriety of particular conceptions of the
231. Eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398,404 (1963).
232. Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (recognizing Amish belief as religious because it
was a theocratic view "of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living"), with United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)
(defining the standard for a Congressional exemption from military service as "[a] sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by... God").
233. For a useful discussion of authorities exploring the definition of religion, see
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 28, at 1663-69. See also McConnell, supra note 14, at 1491
n.420.
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divine.234  The Court should avoid inquiries into "the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
litigants' interpretation of those creeds,' 235 or the like. It is no more
appropriate for a court to judge the importance of a religion than to
judge the importance of an idea.236
The appropriate judicial position is one of neutrality-of notjudging the merits or demerits of particular religious claims. Both the
United States and German constitutional orders understand this,
requiring official neutrality in matters of faith. As a matter of
comparative law, the German idea of neutrality is more far-reaching
than the American for the simple reason that all claims of
conscience-religious, nonreligious, and antiwar-are respected
according to the charter of Article Four. German law thus avoids the
further question apparent in American law, under the Establishment
Clause, over whether respect only of religious claims is nonneutral in
respect of nonreligious claims. Proper understanding of the
relationship of Free Exercise freedoms to constitutional democracy
aids understanding of the proper judicial role.
Second, established Free Exercise law likewise demonstrates how
careful consideration of religious and social interests can be made in
the context of concrete cases, as we have reviewed in both United
237States and German law. While these questions are difficult, they are
not insurmountable. Difficult questions call for careful judgment, as
in any constitutional question. But after all, that is why we have
judges: to decide hard cases.
These questions must be asked and answered in German
constitutional law as well. We might learn something from the
Germans. The German Constitutional Court straightforwardly goes
about the business of performing the judicial role in the manner
described above. As our review of German law demonstrates, the
German Court first judges whether the actions at issue are sincerely
conscience based for purposes of Article Four. This inquiry is much
234. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1516.
235. Hemandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
236. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990)("It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before
applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them todetermine the 'importance' of ideas before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free
speech field.").
237. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-05 (1963); Rumpelkammer,
BVerfGE 24, 236 et seq. (1968) (discussing the consideration of religious and social
interests).
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easier in German law because the textual mandate of Article Four
privileges all conscience-based claims-religious, ideological, and war
based. The text thereby reduces the difficulty of judging the ambit of
Free Exercise claims. Once these questions are settled affirmatively,
the Constitutional Court then performs the sensitive job of ascertaining
whether a conscience-based accommodation is merited in the
circumstance.
Notably, the Constitutional Court does not exhibit the doubt
about making these judgments sometimes evident in Supreme Court
decision making.238  Perhaps the greater confidence of the
Constitutional Court is attributable to the stronger textual mandate of
Article Four. Or perhaps the Smith Court exaggerates the difficulty of
courts' rendering of judgments where accommodation is merited."'
Further, the German constitutional order quite clearly preferences
religion-as part of its value order. The strong rooting of religion in
the German Constitution facilitates the judicial role. Yet, we might
observe, can we seriously argue that the American scheme does not
take religion seriously? Even if it might be argued that the First
Amendment lacks the certitude of Article Four, American history, early
American leaders' and Framers' intentions,24° and Supreme Court
238. See, e.g, Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
239. Wuerth, supmnote 30, at 1201.
240. Consider the statements of these early Americans. George Washington stated:
In my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated with
great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may
always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard to the protection
and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 562 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Letter from George Washington to the Religious Society Called
Quakers (Oct. 1789), in GEORGE WASHINGTON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING 11 (E. Humphrey ed., 1932).
Oliver Ellsworth, a framer of the First Amendment and later Chief Justice of the United
States, stated that government could interfere with religion only when required "to prohibit
and punish gross immoralities and impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil
example and detriment." Id at 562-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTrruTION 640 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell, in defending the Oath Clause stated "as
one of the strongest proofs that could be adduced, that it was the intention of those who
formed this system to establish a general religious liberty in America." Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 28, at 1578 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 193 (J. Elliot ed., 2d
ed. 1836) (1788). While Iredell speaks to the Oath Clause, and not the Free Exercise Clause,
his statement attests to the high value Americans placed on religion.
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241pronouncements should reasonably buttress the text to make clear
that religion is a highly preferred value in the American constitutional
order as well.
Supreme Court decision making is limited by an additional
constraint as well, not evident in the German scheme. Under
American law, Free Exercise freedoms are textually limited by
Establishment Clause freedoms. 242  The relationship between these
religious freedoms has proved to be among the most thorny in
American law, and cannot be resolved here. However, we need to
reach some basic understanding over the appropriateness of
accommodation of Free Exercise in this more complicated American
constitutional setting.
A plausible concern is that any accommodation of Free Exercise
claims is itself a favoring of one religion over another or religion over
nonreligion. 4' No doubt, any official favoring of religion has the
potential to violate Establishment Clause freedoms. However, just as
Establishment Clause freedoms limit Free Exercise freedoms, Free
Exercise freedoms logically limit Establishment Clause freedoms as
well. We have tended to read these clauses as antagonistic to one
another. Since both are designed to secure religious freedom, it makes
much more sense to view them as mutually supportive. Each secures
elements of religious freedom. Establishment Clause freedoms secure
a person's right to be free from coercion of conscience. "  Free
Exercise freedoms empower a person to act on his or her belief in the
divine. The Religion Clauses thereby limit official power in this
regard.
Because government is powerless to act, people are free to act on
Free Exercise. Government too is subordinate to God,245 just as
government is subordinate to inalienable rights. In this view, therefore,
241. See, e.g., Boeme, 521 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wisconsin v. Yoder
406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("The values underlying [the Religion Clauses] have been zealously
protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social
importance.").
242. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
243. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1420 n.42; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Free
Exercise Clause: A Strctural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 943, 949-50 (1986) ("Not only was South Carolina's denial of
unemployment compensation to Sherbert not a violation of the free exercise clause, it was a
violation of the establishment clause for the Court to require the State to grant it to her.").
According to Judge McConnell, it is historically unsound to argue that Free Exercise
accommodations violate the Establishment Clause. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1511-12.
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
245. McConnell, supm note 14, at 1516.
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government acknowledgment of Free Exercise is nothing more than
the positive duty of government to recognize the limitation of its power
inherent in religious freedom.246  There is a difference in quality
between official recognition of an inalienable right and proactive
governmental action in support of religion, which may be coercion of
conscience. For example, it is one thing to accommodate religious
belief by suspending a law requiring parents to send their children to
public school through high school contrary to their creed. 47 It is quite
another matter altogether for government to establish a school district
for a particular religious creed.
4 1
Viewed from another perspective, it cannot be any other way. To
interpret the Establishment Clause as prohibiting any governmental
accommodation of Free Exercise is essentially to render the Free
Exercise Clause meaningless. What Free Exercise claim could ever
249
meet this test? No word in the Constitution can be without meaning.
Thus, whatever the relationship between these sets of religious
freedoms, the Establishment Clause cannot be so encompassing as to
suffocate the Free Exercise Clause.25  Like so many issues of
American constitutional law, the appropriate judicial response to this
difficulty should be caution-in interpreting the range of
accommodation under Free Exercise-not abandonment.
2 5
'
Based upon this summary review of the textual evidence, and of
the utility and purposes of a Free Exercise Clause, the evidence would
seem to favor the approach of Sherbert over Smith. Textually, the
singling out of religious practice as a preferred freedom is more in
accord with Sherbertthan Smith. Textual evidence points to protection
of religiously grounded conduct. In German law, textual evidence
strongly supports religious practice. Historically, Sherbert is more in
246. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,415-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
247. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,229-34 (1972).
248. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-08 (1994) (holding that creating a
separate school district for Satmar Hasidic Jews singles out a particular religious sect for
special treatment).
249. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect... ").
250. One approach to resolving this dilemma is offered by the Supreme Court in Corp.
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Chn'st of Latter Day Saints v Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 334-40 (1987). At issue in Amos was whether the Church could require its employees to
be members of the Church without violating federal civil rights laws. The Court concluded
that the Church could act pursuant to its tenets despite the requirements of the law. Id. at 338-
40.
251. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(holding that over substantive due process, "history counsels caution and restraint. But it
does not counsel abandonment").
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line with Madison, Smith with Locke and Jefferson.252 Utility wise, the
Sherbert approach favors religion over order and yet is able to
constrain disorder so that society may well function. Purposefully,
Sherbert captures better the point of Free Exercise by facilitating the
ability of people to practice religion within society.
Yet, whether the desirable approach is one or the other perhaps
matters less on issues of constitutional interpretation or utility. Which
is suitable to a social order may be more about a constitutional order
and its priorities than anything else. A society that is willing to
recognize religion on its own terms, accepting conscience as man's
path to God, and then respect it by allowing a person to give God his or
her due, is a society that places religion at the fore of its constitutional
priorities. The rule of Sherbert accords religion this high, preferred
place in the American constitutional value structure. Since the essence
of Free Exercise is a claim for liberty-the liberty to practice
religion-Sherbertis broadly in line with the architectonic principle of
the United States, liberty.253 Likewise, with its estimation of religion as
integral to human dignity, the ultimate value of the constitutional order,
the German charter values personal religious liberty as a high priority,
which also is in line with the architectonic principle of the German
charter, dignity. Both the American and German rules place a
premium on religious freedom, not confining it to belief, but
facilitating its free scope according to its need, including the ability to
act upon it. Both laws accord primacy to conscience, suspending
claims of law not of overriding magnitude in order to relieve people
from the anguish of choosing religion or law. By contrast, the rule of
Smith estimates religion correspondingly less. A rule of law that
circumscribes religion by the breadth of the general law retards
religious freedom to that extent.
IV COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
Our review of Free Exercise rights in Germany and the United
States has led us to clarify the values underlying a Free Exercise
Clause and the purposes it serves in constitutional democracy.
252. The historical record seems equivocal. Judge McConnell argues that history
favors Sherbert more than Smith. In his review, the early history of pre-Constitutional
America favors Sherbert, the early post-Constitutional period is more equivocal. McConnell,
supra note 14, at 1466-73, 1511-14. Others dispute McConnell's findings. See, e.g., City of
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537-44 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Philip A. Hamburger,
A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histoical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 915, 916-33 (1992). Further review of the historical record would be worthwhile.
253. For elaboration of this theme, see EBERLE, supm note 10, at 13-17.
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Comparative law has a useful role to play in clarifying constitutional
values and tenets of public philosophy. Fundamentally, a Free Exercise
Clause empowers a person to act freely on affairs of the soul within the
constraints of society. The clause recognizes a dilemma of human
existence within constitutionally organized society: what to do when
faced with competing claims of conscience and law. Should a person
follow affairs of the soul---"soul liberty"254-- or the demands of
society?
Our review of the two laws discloses different ways of unraveling
this dilemma. German law is very empowering. Viewing the conflict
between conscience and legal obligation as one requiring an individual
to pay an unacceptably high price, German law unravels the dilemma
by strongly favoring claims of conscience over claims of law. On the
whole, German law is willing to grant wide accommodation to the
realm of faith based activities-including suspending legal claims that
ordinarily would apply (even when generally applicable)-so that a
person may be free, legally and spiritually, to act on conscience. The
goal of German law is to empower a person to live according to chosen
tenets relatively unimpeded. German law strives to so accommodate
conscience in ways that complement social order. The German
solution thereby demonstrates a way of how balance between religious
liberty and social order may be achieved.
American law solves the dilemma exactly opposite of German
law. For the most part, conflicts between conscience and law are
resolved by demanding obedience to the law over conscience. Great
danger is seen in "each conscience [becoming] ... a law unto itself."255
Yet, there is danger to religious liberty in overemphasizing order as
well. Under the rule of Smith, Free Exercise rights consist only of the
right to believe, act on such belief pursuant to ritual or worship, and
claims to fair treatment under a principle of nondiscrimination
whereby the social order may not disfavor religion in relation to other
activities. 21' This rule of Smith largely follows the position of John
Locke, of the seventeenth century, and eclipses the earlier position of
the Court expressed in Sherbert. On this review of the law, American
law is unwilling as a matter of right to grant accommodation to
religiously motivated actors except as noted above or by majoritarian
grace. We might therefore characterize American law as rather
254. Eberle, supra note 121, at 442 (describing Roger Williams's thought).
255. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
256. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-35 (1993).
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restrictive of Free Exercise rights. American law makes only minimal
effort to achieve equilibrium between religious liberty and social order,
instead reflexively deferring to authorities' demands for order.
A further notable contrast between the two laws is the breadth of
accommodation present in German law. German law presumptively
favors conscience-based actors faced with constraints imposed by the
social order. Accommodation is the rule, not the exception. Pursuant
to this methodology, the German Constitutional Court has suspended
general legal requirements concerning rules of the marketplace,257
criminal negligence,258 the rendering of oaths,259 and requirements of
the slaughter of animals26 ° in just our short survey of the law. This
pattern of law, predictably favoring accommodation, reveals a rich
mosaic of people's chosen acts of conscience forced to the brink by
social requirements.
The broad accommodation of religion manifest in German law
contrasts again with American law. Under Smith, obviously,
accommodation no longer exists as a matter of constitutional right.
The forum for accommodation is the democratic process. However,
even under the prior rule of judicial accommodation in Sherberit,
exemption was an extremely rare occurrence. Recall again that
accommodation occurred in only two instances: unemployment
compensation26' and mandatory high school attendance."' It was more
common the case that accommodation was denied than granted.263
An additional contrast between the two laws is who, among
members of society, has been granted accommodation. A country's
commitment to religious liberty is especially revealed in how it treats
minority sects. Religious liberty is always popular from the viewpoint
of majorities. Whether equal rights are accorded minorities is an acid
test of religious liberty.
257. See Rumpelkammer, BVerfGE 24, 236 (1968).
258. See Blood Transfusion, BVerfGE 32, 98 (1971).
259. See Bavarian Official Oath, BVerfGE 79, 69 (1988); Denial of Witness Oath,
BVerftGE 33, 23 (1972).
260. Ritual Slaughter, BVerfGE 104, 337 (2002).
261. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
262. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
263. See, e.g., Lyng v. N.W Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453-55,
457-58 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 722-23 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-10 (1986); United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-10 (1961)
(applying a methodology that evolved into the rule of Sherber).
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Here too we can observe that German law evidences certain
solicitude toward minorities. First, accommodation of Christian
fundamentalists, in Blood Transfusion, Denial of Witness Oath, and
Bavarian Official Oath, is noteworthy. Evangelical Christians are
considered as outside the mainstream in Germany, viewed with
suspicion, notwithstanding the predominantly Christian orientation of
the country. Granting of public corporation status to Jehovah's
Witnesses2 4 is further evidence of this toleration. Second, apart from
these cases involving Christians, notable further is accommodation of
minority sects, as concerning Muslims in Ritual Slaughter, Islamic
Teacher' Head Scarf, and Turlash Sales Clerks Head Scar, and
Jews,265 and recognition of religious autonomy rights for the Baha' i.
266
Thus, German law evidences certain accommodation of minority
sects, consistent with a principle of religious equality. It is also fair to
observe that most of the German cases involve accommodation of the
dominant Christian group.
By contrast, American law does not exhibit solicitude toward
minorities. First, we must observe again that American law has been
quite restrictive generally of Free Exercise rights, granting
accommodations only in two instances, unemployment compensation
and mandatory high school attendance.267 In the latter instance, the
Court made a point of emphasizing that the Old World Amish were
law abiding citizens. Further, it is worth observing that these
accommodations were granted to Christians only. Minority sects have
never been granted an accommodation in Supreme Court case law.268
On the other hand, in view of the pattern of presumptive rejection of
264. Jehovah's Witness, BVerfGE 102, 370 (2000).
265. Cross in Court Room, BVerfGE 35, 366 (1973) (ruling that a cross displayed in a
court room must be removed in view of an objection from a Jewish lawyer).
266. Baha'i, BVerfGE 83,341 (1Q91).
267. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222 ("[T]he Amish community has been a highly successful
social unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional 'mainstream.' Its members
are productive and very law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in its
usual modem forms."). In Sherbert v Vemer, the Court similarly observed that the claimant
was a good citizen. 374 U.S. 348, 410 (1963). "This is not a case in which an employee's
religious convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society." Id. Perhaps
Americans overemphasize order in religious matters.
268. The Supreme Court has rejected accommodations for Jews, Muslims, and Native
Americans. See Lyng v. N.W Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-58,453-
55 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 506-10 (1986); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-10 (1961). The
treatment accorded practitioners of the Santeria religion in Church of the LukutmI Babalu
Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah was not an accommodation, of course, but rather discrimination
under the rule of Smith. 508 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1993).
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accommodation of religious actors, it is fair to say that predominant
Christian beliefs have fared only marginally better than minority sects.
These developments point to the conclusion that individual Free
Exercise rights are accorded much broader scope in Germany than in
the United States. In a sense, this observation is somewhat startling. A
person would not ordinarily expect personal religious freedoms to be
more vibrant in Germany than in the United States, at least as viewed
from the standpoint of accommodation within society of religiously
motivated actors. Upon further consideration, it is perhaps less
startling that Germany has strong religious liberty. Under the Basic
Law, the Federal Republic is constituted as a social democratic state
committed to human dignity and human rights. Capturing the
transcendent nature of the human condition, Free Exercise rights are an
integral part of this central focus on the human person. Free Exercise
rights, like other rights, are tangible radiations of human dignity that
facilitate realization of human capacity. Human rights stand at the fore
of a dignitarian vision searching to gird society to higher principles of
justice and human fulfillment. Given such a constitutional order, it is
quite natural that Free Exercise rights will be highly preferred.
It is more surprising that American personal religious liberty
pales in comparison to German. America was founded on principles
of religious liberty more than 350 years ago, with Rhode Island being
the first settlement founded on religious liberty in the Western world.
In view of such history, it is surprising that the impulse of American
law is to constrain religious liberty rather than empower it.
Viewed this way, there is much American law could learn from
the dignitarian focus of German law. For one thing, focusing on
individual dignity would not likely lead to excessive deference to
majoritarian rule as a means to constrain religion. Instead, a
dignitarian focus would accord greater regard to human needs.
Human needs require acknowledgment of the importance of the
spiritual and transcendent dimension to life that Free Exercise rights
capture. Being more attuned to the needs of the believer, as the
German Constitutional Court shows, and less attuned to the exigencies
of law and order would help.
Second, the Constitutional Court demonstrates how an
independent court can judge the boundaries of religious freedoms
without impugning religion or courting anarchy. The point is partly
one of methodology. Weighted balancing favoring religion (as in
Germany and under Sherber) is more likely to give religion its due
than a categorical rule protecting belief but not action (Smith). And
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the point is partly one of judgment. The Constitutional Court shows
how to cut to the heart of a Free Exercise claim, explicate the relevant
considerations-assessing the demands of religion as they relate to the
social claim-and then formulate a clear, workable rule of law that
respects religion without undermining society.
Looking outside our borders has allowed us to gain insight into
the purpose and utility of a Free Exercise Clause as it functions in a
constitutional democracy. The Constitutional Court serves as an
alternative standard by which to measure the work of the Supreme
Court. Comparative law has a useful function to perform in holding
native ways up to the light of another way, and seeing how native ways
compare and also, when viewed in this more detached manner, how
they compare with the design of native law and traditions. With this
broader visage, we can gain perspective on whether we are true to our
best intentions or whether we stray. In the case of Free Exercise rights,
the comparison in approach of the two Courts is so dramatic,
notwithstanding similarities in text and constitutional design, that
perhaps it ought to give us pause to ponder whether the rule of Smith
is appropriate.

